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ARTICLE

TOWARD A TAX-BASED EXPLANATION OF THE
LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS

Kyle D. Logue*

HE

INTRODUCTION

so-called liability insurance crisis of 1985 and 1986
transformed the way we think about tort law and about
liability insurance markets. The crisis phenomena, which first
appeared in late 1984 and lasted until mid-1986, consisted of
enormous increases in liability insurance premiums and alarming
reductions in the availability of certain types of liability
coverage.1 In the two principal liability lines of insurance (Other
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1 This description of the crisis phenomena is taken from the following sources: Tort
Policy Working Group, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of Tort Policy Working Group
on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance
Availability and Affordability 1, 6-15 (1986) [hereinafter DOJ Report, Tort Policy];
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale LJ.
1521, 1526-27 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis]; George L. Priest, Modern
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Liability and Medical Malpractice), premiums increased by
hundreds (in some cases thousands) of percentage points in a
matter of months.2 At the same time, the availability of liability
insurance contracted sharply. The liability policies that were
sold during this period contained large deductibles and unusually
low policy limits. Moreover, for some specific liability risks-for
example, coverage for day care centers-no insurance policies
were sold at all; that is, no coverage was offered at a price
consumers were willing to pay.3 In addition, as property-casualty
insurers were raising their premiums by unprecedented amounts,
the industry in the aggregate was posting its largest underwriting
losses ever.4
Numerous commentators have sought to explain the crisis
phenomena. Indeed, the pursuit of a satisfactory explanation of
the crisis dominated products liability and insurance scholarship
for several years in the mid- and late 1980s.5 Three main
explanatory theories have been offered by scholars. Perhaps the
most influential is the tort-based theory,6 which alleges that the
crisis was the result of the "revolutionary" and socially
disastrous expansion in the number of lawsuits and in the size
Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1987). For a review of the
implications for tort reform and insurance-law reform that scholars have derived from
the crisis, see Symposium, Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 367
(1988).
2 Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note l, at 1527.
3 Id. at 1521. See also George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, Time, Mar.
24, 1986, at 16, 16-19 (giving anecdotal accounts of premium increases and reduced
policy availability).
4 See infra Chart 2 (showing pattern of underwriting losses). See also DOJ Report,
Tort Policy, supra note l, at 17-18 (citing underwriting losses as part of crisis). An
underwriting loss occurs if, in a given reporting year, the insurer's premium revenue
is less than its underwriting expenses-the largest of which expenses is the net increase
in the insurer's loss reserves during the year. See Sean Mooney & Larry Cohen, Basic
Concepts of Accounting & Taxation of Property/Casualty Insurance Companies 11
(1991). Other crisis phenomena included a noticeable shift away from commercial
liability insurance and towards self-insurance and an attempt to restructure the
commercial liability insurance contract from its traditional occurrence-based form to
a claims-made form. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1527.
s See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
6 Richard N. Clark, Frederick Warren-Boulton, David D. Smith & Marilyn J. Simon,
Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 Yale J. on Reg.
367, 389 (1988) ("Perhaps the most frequently offered explanation for the [insurance
crisis of 1985 and 1986] involves the legal system.").
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and frequency of jury awards.7 A competing theory asserts that
the crisis was a hoax, and that the increase in premiums and
changes in coverage were manifestations of collusive behavior
within the insurance industry.8 A third explanation, which has
gained wide acceptance among mainstream economists, is that
the crisis represented merely an extreme downturn in the
property-casualty cycles, which was brought on by some type of
"shock" to the industry's insurance-writing capacity.9
As explained below, each of the three dominant theories fails
to account for various characteristics of the crisis. Most
significantly, they fail to explain adequately the timing of the
crisis. This Article asserts that these theories ignore a fourth,
and potentially complementary, explanation: the effect of
anticipated and actual changes in federal income tax laws.
During a period that almost precisely coincided with the
timing of the insurance crisis, the Treasury Department and
Congress were publicly considering tax reform proposals that
would have dramatically affected the property-casualty insurance
industry, proposals that were eventually enacted as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "'86 Act").10 This Article explores
the possibility that the link between the tax reform debates
leading up to the '86 Act and the crisis was more than pure
coincidence. To focus the inquiry (and to make things
interesting), I will attempt to defend the following hypotheses:
(1) Anticipating the enactment of the '86 Act, property
casualty insurers increased their loss reserves11
substantially in 1984, 1985, and 1986 so as to increase the
size of their deductible underwriting expenses in those
years.
1

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
9 See infra Part I.C.
10 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). See infra Part II.C.
11 A "loss reserve" is a technical insurance-accounting concept. It is a liability on
a property-casualty insurer's year-end balance sheet that represents the insurer's
discretionary estimate of its future loss-claim payments arising from outstanding
policies. The annual increase in loss reserves produces a large deduction for
regulatory and federal income tax purposes. For further discussion of loss reserves,
see infra Part II.A.
s
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(2) By increasing their loss reserves in 1984-86, insurers were
able to (a) shift income from pre-'86 Act years in which
the top corporate income tax rate was 46 percent to post
'86 Act years in which the top corporate rate was
substantially lower; and (b) take these loss-reserve
deductions at their undiscounted value-that is, a value
that ignores the time value of money.
(3) Finally, this sudden increase in loss reserves either caused
or facilitated the crisis phenomena in the liability
insurance market in 1985-86.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly summarizes
the existing theories of the crisis and highlights their main
weaknesses. Part II then explains why, during the period leading
up to the enactment of the '86 Act, property-casualty insurers
had a temporary tax-based incentive to overstate their reported
loss reserves. Part III takes a preliminary look at the insurance
industry data that bear on the question whether insurers re
sponded to the incentives created by the enactment of the '86
Act by overstating their loss reserves during this period. Finally,
assuming that insurers were in fact induced by the '86 Act to
change their loss-reserving patterns, Part IV explains how such
a change in loss reserves could have contributed to the crisis
phenomena.
I. THE COMPETING EXPLANATIONS OF THE CRISIS
A. The Tort-Based Theory

The tort-based theory of the crisis is a central component of
the now-conventional argument for tort reform, particularly
products liability reform. That argument, in general terms, goes
as follows:
(1) The civil liability system in the United States has
experienced an extraordinary expansion over the past
several decades, an expansion that has included the
introduction of strict products liability, the adoption in
many states of joint and several liability, and an
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astonishing increase in the frequency and size of tort
awards for injuries suffered in the context of product and
service use.12
(2) This expansion in the tort system has been socially
harmful and should therefore be halted or reversed.13
(3) The liability insurance crisis of 1985-86 is evidence of both
the expansion in the tort system and the disastrous effects
of that expansion.
A version of this theory was advanced in an influential report,
entitled Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes,
Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance
Availability and Affordability.14 The DOJ Report attributed the
12 See, e.g., Tort Policy Working Group, U.S. Dep't of Justice, An Update on the
Liability Crisis 54 (1987) ("The recent expansion of tort liability doctrines has been
one of the most dramatic and far-reaching developments in modern American law.");
Robert L. Rabin, Perspectives on Tort Law 154-55 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 2d ed. 1983)
(chapter introduction) ("[C]ourts have effected a veritable revolution in products
liability law during the last decade, substituting strict liability in tort for a liability
system based on the fault principle."); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 153436; George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461, 461 (1985)
("Since 1960, our modern civil liability regime has experienced a conceptual revolution
that is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system.
Legal rules that had been entrenched for decades . . . were suddenly repudiated and
replaced by
radically different [rules]."). See generally Richard A. Epstein,
Modern Products Liability Law, chs. 2-4 (1980) (giving historical account of
development of products liability law); Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal
Revolution and Its Consequences (1988) (discussing evolution of tort law from its
contract law origins).
13 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability
Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 2193, 2196 (1989) ("The present rules of product liability law
are both inefficient and unwelcome
"); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at
1589 ("[T]he diffuse and indiscriminate expansion of substantive tort liability has led
to the unraveling of insurance markets," creating "a tort law insurance regime that
disrupts insurance markets and harms the poor."); Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its
Reform, supra note 1, at 5 (1987) ("[M]odern tort law as currently defined largely
thwarts the accident reduction and compensation objectives."); Michael J. Trebilcock,
The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A
Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 929, 92931 (1987).
14 DOJ Report, Tort Policy, supra note 1; see also Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note
1, at 1532-33 (discussing the report).
.
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insurance crisis to (a) an increase in the frequency of tort claims
and in the size of tort damage awards that occurred during the
years leading up to the crisis; and (b) the increase in legal
uncertainty stemming from the expansion in tort doctrines.1s To
support these claims, the report relied primarily on the following
statistics:
The number of products liability cases filed in federal district
courts increased 758% from 1974 to 1985.16
The number of medical-malpractice lawsuits per physician
"more than doubled" from 1976 to 1981.17
The average annual increase in personal injury awards in
creased more than 15% each year from 1975 to 1985.JS
Between 1975 and 1985, the average medical malpractice jury
verdict increased from $220,018 to $1,017,716, and the average
products liability verdict increased from $394,580 to
$1,850,452.19
Largely on the basis of these data, the report concluded that the
tort system was in need of drastic reform,20 a conclusion that
found a receptive audience among state lawmakers. By 1987,
forty-two state legislatures had passed some type of tort-reform
legislation, including the placement of caps on damage awards,
the elimination of joint and several liability, and the abrogation
of the collateral-source rule.21
In spite of the enormous influence of the tort-law explanation
of the crisis, a shift in tort law cannot fully explain the crisis.
The data upon which the theory is grounded-the decade-long
15 DOJ Report, Tort Policy, supra note l, at 2-3 ("[I]ndications are that
developments in tort law are a major cause [of] the sharp premium increases" during
the crisis.).
16 Id. at 2, 45.
11 See id. at 47.
1s Id.
19 Id. at 2-3.
20 Id. at 3-4.
21 Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1587-88.
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increase in tort awards-could well explain an upward trend in
liability insurance premiums during a similar period. However,
those data do not easily account for the sudden events of 1985
and 1986. Other scholars have recognized this discrepancy
between the shift in tort law and the crisis phenomena.22 One
of the most influential of these, Professor George L. Priest, has
noted the inadequacy of the tort hypothesis as set forth in the
Department of Justice report:
[T]he Justice Department's study falls far short of documenting
the source of the [insurance] crisis. The increase in rates of
claims and size of damage awards reported by the Justice
Department are far smaller than reported increases in insurance
premiums....No trial or settlement statistics ... have shown
increases that even remotely correspond to the increases in
insurance premiums at multiples of four, five, ten, fifteen, and
more over a period of a few months.23

22 It is possible that the timing of the crisis, including the suddenness of it, is entirely
consistent with the tort-based explanation in the following way: Although the data
reveal a relatively even (albeit steep) increase in tort claims over time, perhaps the full
import of the data did not "sink in" until 1985 and 1986. And perhaps the realization
at that time spread so quickly through the industry as to cause the relatively sudden
events of 1985 and 1986.
23 Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1533-34; see also sources cited infra notes
25 (arguing that collusion among insurers was more likely than the tort crisis) & 43
(describing cycles in property-casualty industry). Note, however, that million dollar
jury verdicts in medical malpractice and products liability cases did increase
significantly (in percentage terms) in 1983. But there were even greater percentage
increases in 1981 for medical malpractice cases and in 1979 for products liability cases,
and neither of those years immediately preceded a crisis. DOJ Report, Tort Policy,
supra note l, at 40. Similar observations can be made about trends in the average jury
awards for medical malpractice and products liability cases. Id. at 37-38. Moreover,
there is at least one study of state court tort awards that found "no evidence to
support the existence of a national 'litigation explosion' in state trial courts during the
1981-84 period." National Center for State Courts, A Preliminary Examination of
Available Civil and Criminal Trend Data in State Trial Courts for 1978, 1981 and 1984
(1986). These data, of course, may not capture the whole picture. It is conceivable,
for example, that the crisis was triggered by a single court decision or jury verdict in
1983, 1984, or 1985 that insurers regarded as signifying a dramatic change in the
liability landscape. I am aware of no study that has rigorously attempted to identify
such a case or series of cases. Another aspect of the crisis that does not fit well with
the tort theory is the extraordinary jump in the property-casualty industry's "loss
ratio." This argument is discussed infra Part III.
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Thus, the tort-based theory leaves both the magnitude and the
timing of the explosion in the cost of liability insurance
something of a puzzle.24
B. The Collusion Theory

The tort-based theory has had its detractors from the
beginning. Most prominent among them are the commentators
who attribute the crisis phenomena to collusion among property
casualty insurers.25 According to the collusion theory, there
never was a crisis; rather, the so-called crisis phenomena were
merely manifestations of a successful "recartelization" within the
property-casualty industry. The proponents of this view further
contend that the tort-based explanation of these phenomena was
concocted by the insurance industry to persuade legislators of
24 In a 1987 article, Professor Priest advanced a tort-based explanation of the crisis
that differed from that put forward in the DOJ Report. See Priest, Insurance Crisis,
supra note 1. Priest argued that the crisis was the result of adverse selection and risk
pool unraveling in liability insurance markets that were caused by the ill-conceived
expansion of products liability law. Id. at 1582-87. Therefore, under Priest's view, the
appropriate response to the crisis was to reform products liability law. Id. at 1587-90.
In contrast, Professors Steve Croley and Jon Hanson have suggested a very different
interpretation of the crisis phenomena. They contend that all of the insurance-market
conditions cited by Priest and others as evidence of a crisis in our tort system actually
are consistent with the claim that the expansion in products liability law was efficient.
Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation for Recent Events .in Products Liability, 8 Yale J. On Reg. 1 (1991).
Neither Priest nor Croley and Hanson, however, attempt to explain the actual timing
of the crisis, nor do they mention the possible influence of the federal income tax laws.
I should also note that Priest's explanation helps to explain the suddenness of the
crisis. That is, once consumer and producer risk pools began to unravel, as Priest
argues they did, it might have sped up the process of increasing premiums and
reductions in capacity.
is E.g., Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson
Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 Yale J.
on Reg. 397, 397-98 (1988) (alleging "industry conduct indicating the existence of
collusion, evidence that collusive conduct protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act
caused the insurance crisis of 1985-86, and the supra-competitive profitability of
general liability and medical malpractice insurance over the long run" as proof of the
collusion theory); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of
Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 455, 463 (1988) ("[T]he cartel
hypothesis says that the industry in 1985 recovered from a seven-year price war
successfully re-establishing cartel prices
The cartel or conspiracy hypothesis is
consistent with the increase in premiums, the increase in profits, and the suddenness
of the premium increase.").
.

.
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the need for tort "reform."26 One could also argue, along the
same lines, that the industry decried the tort crisis in an effort
to mask abnormal economic (if not accounting) profits.
Under the most plausible version of the collusion theory,
coordination among property-casualty insurers during the crisis
was facilitated by the Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), the
primary insurance-rating bureau for the property-casualty
industry.27 Historically, ISO's principal function has been to
assist property-casualty insurers in setting their premiums
accurately, that is, in setting premiums that will allow insurers to
cover all of their underwriting expenses. It is commonly
believed that accurate pricing of insurance policies requires some
form of centrally coordinated sharing of information among
insurers:
Cooperation among insurance companies is necessary to achieve
accurate pricing in the industry-at least for casualty and
property lines.
Insurance premiums reflect the provider's
evaluation of the probable costs of paying claims, as well as
other costs of doing business, and a reasonable provision for
profit. But in the case of property and casualty lines, the cost
of claims payable in the future is difficult to assess at the time
the policy is written, because the probability of an event
occurring and the severity of the event if it does occur are both
difficult to calculate.
Proper evaluation of risk requires
extensive sampling of past occurrences of the events insured

26 Angoff, supra note 25, at 412-14. Angoff further suggests that the tort-crisis story
was designed to induce state legislators to pass tort-reform legislation. Id. at 398-99,
399 n.12; see also Winter, supra note 25, at 465 ("[A]re the increases in premiums
justified by the torts crisis, or has the torts crisis been exaggerated by the industry to
rationalize excessive premiums?"); William B. Glaberson & Christopher Farrell, The
Explosion in Liability Lawsuits is Nothing But a Myth, Bus. Wk., Apr. 21, 1986, at 24
("The insurance industry has fostered . . . misperceptions with a phenomenally
successful campaign that blames the 'lawsuit crisis' for shocking premium increases and
a paralyzing insurance shortage."); Bob Hunter, The Insurance Industry Is to Blame,
Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1986, at Cl (citing statement by the Insurance Information
Institute that insurance providers are trying to "change the widely held perception that
there is an insurance crisis to a perception of a lawsuit crisis"); David Lauter, Report
Says Litigation Explosion Is a 'Myth,' Nat'I L. J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 46 (discussing
evidence that rate of litigation did not increase during the period leading up to the
crisis).
n Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Costly Policies: State Regulation and
Antitrust Exemption in Insurance Markets 103-06 (1993).
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against, as well as analysis of the historical sample, to predict
losses in the future.
This sampling and analysis can be accomplished only by
cooperative efforts among insurers.28

To this end, ISO has for many years provided insurers with
three general types of information: historical loss costs,
prospective loss costs, and advisory rates. 29 Historical loss costs
are data regarding insurers' loss-claim experience, which ISO
collects from insurers throughout the industry. Prospective loss
costs, on the other hand, are ISO's estimates of claim payments
that insurers can expect to pay out in the future. To derive
these prospective estimates, ISO uses various statistical
techniques incorporating assumptions about inflation rates and
trends in liability judgments and technological innovation to
extrapolate estimated future costs from the historical data.
Although ISO no longer provides advisory rates, it did so for
many years, stopping only in 1989. To generate the advisory
rates, ISO would take the projected loss costs and add an
amount calculated to cover projected operating expenses and the
insurers' profits.30 These advisory rates, as well as the loss cost
data, have long been used by insurers to set premiums. Indeed,
in many states insurance regulators have required insurers to use
the ISO advisory rates. 31
Because insurance-rating bureaus such as ISO are believed to
serve the valuable social function of increasing accuracy in
pricing, they are exempted from the antitrust laws by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.32 It is also understood, however, that
the use of rating bureaus increases the risk of oligopolistic
pricing. Rating bureaus certainly have been used in the past by
insurers to facilitate and enforce cartel pricing. Indeed, such
cartelization has been encouraged-that was the whole point of
the antitrust exemption.33 However, cartel pricing, almost by
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47-48.
30 Id. at 50-52.
31 Id. at 103-04 ("These advisory rates . . . were often used to establish uniform
industry rates, either by way of administrative mandate or through the operation of
private cartels.").
32 Id. at 46-52.
33 Id. at 104 ("It was just such an underwriting association-cartel that precipitated the
28

29
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definition, gives rise to a risk of anticompetitive pricing, that is,
pricing that maximizes industry profits but that does not
necessarily maximize social value. This threat of oligopolistic
pricing is one of the reasons for state regulation of insurance
rate making.
Not surprisingly, some commentators have argued that the
centralization of insurance pricing has, in fact, had an anticom
petitive effect on the property-casualty industry.34 They claim
that support for the collusion theory can be found in the
surprisingly high profits earned by property-casualty insurers
during the crisis. As it turns out, the industry's annual rate of
return during the crisis, as a percentage of net worth, increased
significantly.3s Perhaps more important, in 1985 the stock
market value of the U.S. property-casualty industry increased by
59.4%, whereas the Standard & Poor's 500 index increased by
only 26.9%.36 Although these statistics appear to demonstrate
supra-normal profits, the relevance and appropriate
interpretation of these and other statistics remain controversial,
especially given the use of accounting practices that may obscure
real income and surplus over time.37

Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Association,
which declared that insurance was subject to federal regulation and which in tum
spawned the McCarran-Ferguson Act.") (footnotes omitted).
34 One commentator argues that "[t]he ISO rate is largely responsible for the cyclical
nature of the insurance industry, and in particular for periodic insurance crises like the
one that occurred in 1985-86." Angoff, supra note 25, at 406 (citation omitted). In
1989 ISO announced that it planned to stop issuing advisory rates and would limit
itself to providing historical and prospective-loss-cost data. Macey & Miller, supra
note 27, at 105.
35 Winter, supra note 25, at 461. The property-casualty industry's rate of return grew
from 1.8% in 1984 to 3.8% in 1985 to 11.6% in 1986, while the all-industry rate of
return declined from 135% in 1984 to 11.5% in 1985. Id. It should be noted,
however, that the all-industry rate increased to 15.5% in 1986. Who Did Best and
Worst Among the 500, Fortune, Apr. 27, 1987, at 384.
36 Winter, supra note 25, at 466 & n.49; Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the
Liability Insurance Market, in Liability: Perspectives and Policy 42, 64-65 (Robert E.
Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988).
37 Harrington, supra note 36, at 63. For a discussion of why profitability (or
operating results) is a misleading measure of financial performance with respect to
insurance companies, see Nelson Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-Casualty
Insurance Industry: A Look at Market Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 Yale J.
on Reg. 501, 504-05 (1988).
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Those who reject the collusion theory argue that, given the
structural characteristics of the property-casualty industry, a
successful price-fixing arrangement would be virtually
impossible.3s These characteristics include the large number of
companies in the industry, the fact that none of those companies
has a large share of the market (and thus none is likely to have
significant power over price), and the relatively low entry costs
facing investors wishing to get into the insurance business.39
Taken together, it is argued, these factors make successful long
term price-fixing extremely improbable.
Notwithstanding these structural characteristics, it is quite
plausible, in my view, that insurance pricing decisions in the
property-casualty industry are to some extent influenced by ISO.
First of all, ISO does try to affect insurers' pricing decisions
directly. At least during the crisis, ISO made every effort to
persuade property-casualty insurers to raise their premiums. For
example:
In January 1985, . ..ISO President Daniel McNamara called a
joint industry conference with the Insurance Information
Institute, the industry's public relations arm, where he
emphasized that "the need for significant premium increases,
especially for commercial lines, is absolute for the next three
years." Then, in May 1985, the ISO distributed throughout the
38 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 25, at 457, 463-64 & n.37 (Low concentration in the
industry "indicate[s] that successful collusion among liability insurers is highly unlikely,
even with the partial protection of the McCarran-Ferguson Act against anti-trust
laws."); cf. Paul L. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property
Liability Insurance Industry, 4 Bell J. of Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 375, 391, 397-98 (1973)
(concluding that "property-liability insurance industry possesses the structural
characteristics normally associated with the idealized competitive market," but noting
that pricing behavior deviates from competitive model due to state regulation).
39 Joskow, supra note 38, at 391 ("The property-liability insurance industry possesses
the structural characteristics normally associated with the idealized competitive
market: a large number of firms, operating in a market with low concentration levels,
selling essentially identical products, provided at constant unit costs and with ease of
entry of new and potential competitors."); Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and
Marketing of Insurance, 8-9 (Paul W. MacAvoy ed., 1977) (reprinting U.S. Dep't of
Justice report on antitrust immunities) [hereinafter DOJ Report, Pricing and
Marketing] (giving statistics demonstrating low concentration in the industry and lack
of "significant" entry barriers for all insurance providers except "direct writers."). For
a general discussion of the economics of cartel pricing and the market conditions
conducive to price fixing by cartels, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy:
The Law of Competition and its Practice, 140-51 (1994).
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industry a major position paper, entitled 1985: A Critical Year,
which proclaimed that "the brutal price war of the last six years
is over," and that "significant premium increases are needed,
especially for the current commercial lines products." Suddenly,
in the summer of 1985, insurance companies that only a few
months earlier had been competing on price and ignoring the
ISO "advisory" rate were tripling and quadrupling their
premiums, returning to the ISO rate.40

In addition, as I will explain in the next Section, property
casualty premiums do in fact exhibit a cyclical pattern, a pattern
that one would not expect to see in a competitive market.
Moreover, property-casualty insurers do seem to make pricing
decisions that have a substantial degree of parallelism.41 Thus it
seems plausible that the crisis phenomena could have at least
been exacerbated, if not caused, by a form of either implicit or
explicit collusion.42
C. The Insurance-Cycle Theory

According to the third competing explanation, the insurance
cycle theory, the crisis was a severe manifestation of the hard
portion of the property-casualty cycle. It is generally understood
that the property-liability market is characterized by
40 Angoff, supra note 25, at 406-07 (citations omitted).
41 One explanation for property-casualty insurers' parallel pricing decisions relies on

the notion that market share is of critical importance to insurers: "Companies face a
tough tradeoff ... On the one hand, how much underwriting loss can companies stand
to maintain their market share at inadequate premiums? On the other hand, how
much market share can a company afford to give up, when market share is key to fully
participating in the market when premiums turn up?" Alfred G. Haggerty, ISO Issues
Warning on Rate War, Nat'l Underwriter: Prop.& Casualty Ins., Oct.15, 1982, at 34
(quoting James D. Langell, ISO vice president).
42 The term "collusion," however, may be too strong to describe the behavior that
one observes in the property-casualty industry. Perhaps something akin to "price
leadership" would be more accurate. See F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure
and Economic Performance 176-84 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing evidence of price
leadership). With price leadership there typically is a single firm or small number of
firms that have a dominant share of the market and whose pricing decisions the rest
of the industry follows. In the property-casualty industry there are no such dominant
players, but it could be argued that the functions associated with price leadership are
performed by ISO and state regulatory agencies, with ISO setting prices and state
regulators providing enforcement In any case, the existence of the cycle may be
evidence of a certain amount of "herding" by insurers that suggests coordination in
pricing and quantity decisions.
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underwriting cycles.43 During the so-called soft periods in the
cycles, the supply of insurance is relatively plentiful: Premiums
are comparatively low, and it is relatively easy to obtain
coverage. During the hard periods, however, the supply of
insurance decreases and premiums rise. Likewise, underwriting
performance in the industry appears to rise and fall as the cycles
shift, with underwriting losses occurring during the soft periods
and underwriting gains occurring during the hard periods.44
Scholars have offered a number of explanations of the
property-casualty cycles, and these explanations have in turn
been used to explain the crisis.4s According to one theory, the
43 E.g., Harrington, supra note 36, at 77 ("Most observers believe that the property
liability market is characterized by underwriting cycles: soft markets with readily
available coverage at falling prices followed by hard markets with difficulty in
obtaining coverage and rapidly rising prices."); Anne Gron & Deborah Lucas,
External Financing and Insurance Cycles 1 (NBER working paper 1995) ("The
property-casualty insurance industry is characterized by an 'insurance cycle'-periods
of high prices and rationing followed by periods of expanding coverage and lower
prices."); J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington & Robert W. Klein, Cycles and
Crises in Property/Casualty Insurance: Causes and Implications for Public Policy 1
(1991) ("The property/casualty insurance industry is notorious for its pattern of rising
and falling prices and profits, particularly in long-tail lines.").
44 Underwriting losses occur when loss-reserve deductions in a given reporting year
exceed premiums earned during that year. An underwriting gain occurs when the
reverse is true. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text
4s See, e.g., Cummins, et al., supra note 43, at 1 ("The liability insurance crisis has
been seen as a particularly severe manifestation of the more general phenomenon
known as the 'underwriting cycle."'). Professor Priest provides a concise description
of the insurance cycle theory:
Probably the most prominent explanation of the crisis is the insurance cycle
theory. According to this theory, insurance premiums were low during the late
1970's and early 1980's because interest rates and investment returns were high.
In recent years, as interest rates have fallen with the decline in inflation, insurers
have been forced to increase insurance premiums. The crisis, thus, is no more
than a predictable response to exogenous financial movements. It follows that,
in the future, as interest rates return to higher levels, insurance premiums will
decline and the crisis will pass.
Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1529 (citation omitted).
For a thorough
historical survey of the insurance-cycle studies, see Cummins, et al., supra note 43, at
ch.1. In more recent years, some have argued that the property-casualty cycle has
disappeared. Dan Lonkevich, Pricing and Consolidation: Farewell to the P/C Cycle?,
Best's Review, Property-Casualty Ins. Ed., Sept 1995, at 24-31 (attributing end of
cycle and prolonged period of soft pricing to competition-enhancing consolidation
within the property-casualty insurance market).
Of course, whether the recent
prolonged period of soft pricing in the property-casualty market reflects an end to the
cycle or an increase in the length of the time between turns in the cycle remains to be
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cycles are attributable to fluctuations in interest rates and to the
inverse relationship between interest-rate movements and
insurance-premium movements.46 Under this theory, the soft
market is caused by periods of unusually high interest rates.
During such periods, insurers have an incentive to engage in
cash-flow underwriting, which consists of (a) charging premiums
that produce underwriting losses and then (b) relying on
investment earnings to make up the shortfall. However, under
this theory, when interest rates fall, insurance premiums must
rise commensurately. Applying this theory, the premium
increases in the mid-1980s seem to be at least partially explained
by the fall in interest rates in the early 1980s.47
Fluctuations in interest rates alone, however, do not fully
explain the crisis. First, the facts simply do not match the
theory.48 Interest rates rose sharply during the late 1970s and
peaked in 1981. This was followed in 1982 and again in 1983 by
a substantial drop in rates. In 1984, interest rates increased
modestly and then declined again in 1985 and 1986.49 If
premium movements were inversely related to and primarily
determined by interest rate movements, it is difficult to explain
why the property-casualty market remained soft (i.e., why
premiums remained low) until late 1984 and early 1985.so
Moreover, there is no interest rate explanation for why
seen.
46 See, e.g., DOJ Report, Tort Policy, supra note 1, at 25 ("[T]here is an obvious
inverse relationship between premiums and the prevailing interest rate• . . . When
interest rates are high, premiums tend to be lower since more of the insurer's income
comes from such return on investment; and when interest rates are low, premiums will
tend to be higher since the insurer is more dependent on the premium principal to
cover the anticipated payout.").
47 Insurance Information Institute, Crisis and Recovery: A Review of Business
Liability Insurance in the 1980s, at 9 n.4 (1992) [hereinafter I.I.I., Crisis and
Recovery].
48 See Winter, supra note 25, at 465 n.45 ("A decline in interest rates will increase
the present value of claims and therefore increase competitive premiums. But this
effect cannot account for the magnitude or the timing of the premium increase.").
49 The prime rate displayed the following pattern during this period: 1978 (9.06%),
1979 (12.67%), 1980 (15.27%), 1981 (18.87%), 1982 (14.86%), 1983 (10.79%), 1984
(12.04%), 1985 (9.93%), 1986 (8.33%). Sidney Homer & Richard Sylla, A History of
Interest Rates, 392-93 (3d ed. 1991).
so See, e.g., I.I.I., Crisis and Recovery, supra note 47, at 8-9 (demonstrating effects
of interest rate movements in absence of other factors, and offering price competition
as one factor that overcame these effects).
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premiums would have exploded upward in those years.s1 In a
1992 study reexamining the causes and effects of the crisis, the
Insurance Information Institute ("the Institute"), the public
relations arm of ISO, attempted to explain the time lag between
the drop in interest rates in the early 1980s and the premium
increases that occurred during the crisis. This study attributed
the lag to "continued price competition rather than cash flow
underwriting."52 But that explanation does not account for what
happened in 1984. Indeed, even the Institute has admitted that
no current theory of the crisis accounts for its timing: "The exact
timing of the turn in 1984 is more difficult to explain. Why
1984? Why not earlier?"S3
The most widely accepted explanation of the property-casualty
cycles attributes the soft and hard markets to alternating periods
of excess and limited capacity.s4 Before discussing this explan
ation, however, I should first explain what is meant by the
concept of capacity in this context. The standard measure of
insuring capacity in the property-casualty industry is an insurer's
surplus, which is an accounting term that means the difference
between the insurer's total assets and its total liabilities. Surplus
(sometimes referred to as net worth in other industries) serves
si Kenneth Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 Ohio St. L.
J. 399, 400 (1987) ("[T]he magnitude of [premium increases during the crisis was] far
greater than one would expect if a drop in interest rates alone were responsible.");
Cummins, et al., supra note 43, at 44 ("A significant portion of the changes in
insurance prices and profits observed over the course of an underwriting cycle typically
can be explained by changes in interest rates. However, interest rates do not seem to
be an adequate explanation for all of the cyclical variation in pricing and particularly
for some of the severe shocks in price and availability that have occurred over the past
two decades."); Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 1, at 1530 ("[I]t seems unlikely that
recent alterations in insurer investment portfolios provide a full explanation of the
extraordinary premium increases observed during the current crisis.").
sz I.I.I., Crisis and Recovery, supra note 47, at 9.
S3 Id. at 10. Professor Kenneth Abraham, among others, has raised the same point:
The cutthroat competition that resulted in 'cash-flow' underwriting early in the
decade may have delayed the impact of increased tort liability on premiums for
several years, until the forces of competition for market share finally had to
yield to more rational pricing. Nonetheless, the premium increases of 1985 and

1986 were so dramatic and, in some cases, so enormous, that prudence suggests
a search for other explanations as well

Abraham, supra note 51, at 405. (emphasis added).
S4 See generally Cummins, et al., supra note 43, at 44-46 (summarizing the literature
developing this theory).
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as the insurer's buffer against an especially bad year during
which the insurer suffers an unusually large operating loss.ss
The optimal level of surplus is determined by a number of
factors, one of the most important of which is the variability of
the risks that the company insures. The greater the variability
in the insurer's portfolio of insured risks, the larger the insurer's
surplus must be in order to maintain a given level of financial
security. In addition, as the quantity of insurance written in a
given year increases, the size of the insurer's surplus must also
increase. Inversely, the smaller the insurer's surplus becomes,
the smaller will be the quantity of insurance the insurer can
write without unduly risking insolvency in a bad year.s6
This relationship between the size of the insurance industry's
surplus and its insuring capacity gives rise to the capacity
constraint explanation of the property-casualty cycles and of the
crisis. Under this theory, the industry experiences a reduction
in its collective surplus following unexpectedly large
underwriting or investment losses. This reduction in surplus
creates a temporary period of constrained insuring capacity,
during which coverage is relatively scarce and premiums
relatively high. This explanation of the property-casualty cycles
has been used to explain the liability insurance crisis of 198586.s? The claim is that, at some point before the crisis began, the
property-casualty industry experienced a shock to capacity, that
is, some unanticipated event that reduced the industry's surplus.
Some of the potential shocks have already been mentioned-i.e.,
the unforeseen expansion in the tort system and the unexpected
drop in interest rates. Other possible shocks that have been
suggested include the unexpected expansion in insurance55 Surplus is considered "the [financial] security that stands behind every [insurance]
policy," providing the necessary cushion to support the shock of major catastrophe,
stock market declines and loss reserve inadequacies. Insurance Services Office, Inc.,
1985: A Critical Year 16 (1985); see also Winter, supra note 25, at 470-71 ("Because
companies do not know exactly what their costs are going to be, they must maintain
a buffer of net wealth against adverse outcomes in order to avoid insolvency and in
order to make their contractual promises credible) (footnote omitted).
56 Winter, supra note 25, at 471.
Therefore, insurers who write mostly long-tail
coverage, which has a greater degree of variability from year to year, must maintain
a lower ratio of premiums-written to surplus than insurers who write primarily short
tail coverage.
57 Harrington, supra note 36, at 77-fQ; Winter, supra note 25, at 457.
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company liability and the contraction in the reinsurance markets,
both of which supposedly occurred in the late 1970s and early
1980s.ss The capacity-constraint theorists argue that one of these
shocks, or some combination of them, depleted the industry's
surplus and hence the industry's insuring capacity, thus causing
the dramatic reductions in availability and the increases in
premiums that characterized the crisis.s9
D. Unanswered Questions and a New Composite Explanation

In my view, all of the above-described theories contain
elements that help to explain the crisis. For example, the crisis
probably would not have occurred had it not been for the
expansion of the tort system over the preceding decades and the
drop in interest rates of the early 1980s; both of which reduced
the insurance industry's capacity. Further, the effects of these
capacity constraints were likely magnified because of the way in
which the industry tends to act in unison, as if controlled by a
central pricing agent. Such a composite explanation rings true.
However, it leaves inadequately explained one important aspect
of the crisis: the timing. Why did the crisis happen when it did?
Why did it start in late 1984 and early 1985? Neither the tort
theory, nor the collusion theory, nor the capacity-constraint
theory addresses this issue directly. As Professor Ralph A.
Winter has observed:
One of the most unusual aspects of the crisis was its cata
strophic timing. The crisis hit the liability insurance market
quite suddenly in late 1984 and early 1985 and followed a
period of stable premiums.
Any of the trends in market
conditions to which the crisis is usually attributed-changes in
tort law, introduction or revelation of new risks such as
environmental risks and incidents of child abuse in day-care
centers, or downward movement in interest rates-occurred
over a number of years and not with the suddenness with which
the crisis appeared. The increase in tort awards does appear to
58

Harrington, supra note 36, at 81; Abraham, supra note 51, at 401.
The capacity-constraint explanation (of the cycles generally and of the crisis
specifically) relies on the following assumption: Whenever an insurance company's
surplus is depleted, the insurer will have a tendency to replenish it through retained
earnings rather than through the issuance of new stock. For a defense of this
assumption, see Winter, supra note 25, at 471-74.
59
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have accelerated recently, but not enough to account for the
suddenness of the jump in premium levels and drop in
availability from late 1984 to late 1985, following the period of
relatively stable premiums since 1977.60

In the remainder of the Article, I will describe the tax-based
explanation of the crisis, an explanation that helps to account for
the timing and the suddenness of the crisis. First, in Part II, I
will explain why, in 1984-86, insurers had a tax-based incentive
to increase their loss reserves. Then, in Part III, I will
summarize the available data, suggesting that insurers in fact
responded to this incentive and finally in Part IV will offer some
thoughts as to how this change in loss-reserving behavior could
have contributed to the crisis phenomena.
II. THE TAX HYPOTHESIS
A. Property-Casualty Insurance Accounting
and the Concept of Loss Reserves61

Ever since property-casualty insurance companies have been
subject to the federal revenue laws, their tax treatment has been
governed by a special set of rules that are collected in
Subchapter L of the Internal Revenue Code.62 Subchapter L has
oo Winter, supra note 25, at 461-62 (footnote omitted). Professor Winter goes on to
note that "[i]n attributing the crisis to the developments in tort law in recent years, . . .
[proponents of tort reform do not] explain why the liability insurance market
consequences of the increased instability of the tort system were manifested suddenly
in late 1984." Id. at 465. See also Abraham, supra note 51, at 405-09 ("The most
plausible explanation for the size and suddenness of the premium increases is a decline
in the property/casualty insurance industry's confidence that it could predict the scope
of the liabilities it would face under the policies it sold after 1985 . .
There is little
evidence to explain why insurers' confidence dropped so precipitously in 1985. Surely
the severe tightening of the reinsurance market at the end of 1984 is part of the
answer, although this only pushes the inquiry a step backward. In any case, there may
well have developed a kind of communal mind-set among primary insurers that is not
entirely inconsistent with some of the suppositions of the conspiracy theory.")
(emphasis added).
61 My discussion of insurance accounting draws heavily on the following sources:
Mooney & Cohen, supra note 4; Terrie E. Troxel & George E. Bouchie, Property
Liability Insurance Accounting and Finance (1990); Clair J. Galloway & Joseph M.
Galloway, Handbook of Accounting for Insurance Companies (1986); and Insurance
Accounting and Statistical Association, Property-Liability Insurance Accounting
(Robert W. Strain ed., 1974) [hereinafter !ASA].
62 For general historical discussions of the federal income tax treatment of the
.
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historically required insurers to calculate their taxable income
using statutory accounting, the method of accounting that is
required for state regulatory purposes.
Under statutory
accounting, the largest deduction for any insurer is typically the
loss-reserve deduction, which derives from the net increase in the
insurer's loss reserve for the year.63 A loss reserve is nothing
more than an entry on the insurer's balance sheet that represents
the insurer's best estimate, as of the end of the reporting year,
of the total amount the insurer will have to pay in future loss
claims arising out of covered loss events that have occurred as
of year's end. Put differently, it is an estimate of the amount
necessary to liquidate all of the insurer's outstanding
policyholder claims. 64
The process by which loss reserves are calculated is important
to the tax hypothesis and to a full understanding of the crisis.6s
The first step in the process involves collection by the insurer of
information about its own loss experience from its claims
department. In addition, insurers obtain aggregated industry loss
property-casualty industry, see Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Tax Reform
Proposals: Taxation of Insurance Products and Companies 29-30 (1985); and General
Accounting Office, Congress Should Consider Changing Federal Income Taxation of
the Property/Casualty Insurance Industry 9-11 (Joint Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter
GAO Report].
63 See Troxel & Bouchie, supra note 61, at 84 (1990); Mooney & Cohen, supra note
4, at 27.
64 Troxel & Bouchie, supra note 61, at 85 ("Loss reserves of an insurer are, in theory,
those amounts that would liquidate all unsettled claims against the insurer. These
include not only those claims of which the insurer has knowledge, but also unknown
claims that have occurred and will be reported later."). Although the term "loss
reserve" is commonly used to mean the concept just described, the technically correct
name of the liability on the balance sheet is the "unpaid losses" account. See IASA,
supra note 61, at 29. In addition to the unpaid losses liability, statutory accounting
also requires insurers to record a liability for the anticipated administrative costs
associated with settling the claims represented in the unpaid loss account. This
liability is known as the "loss adjustment and expense" account, and it too is
sometimes referred to as a type of loss reserve-the "LA&E reserve." My discussion
of loss reserving and solvency regulation draws primarily from the following sources:
Mooney & Cohen, supra note 4, at 26-27, 32-34; Ruth E. Salzmann, Estimated
Liabilities for Losses and Loss Adjustment Expenses, in IASA, supra note 61, at 29;
Timothy M. Peterson, Loss Reserving: Property/Casualty Insurance (1981); and from
conversations with property-casualty actuaries.
65 For a brief summary of the principal categories of loss-reserving methods, see
Mooney & Cohen, supra note 4, at 32-34. For a thorough and detailed treatment of
the loss-reserving process, see generally Peterson, supra note 64.
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data provided by ISO in the form of historical loss costs and
prospective loss costs.
After all of these data have been
assembled (along with the development and trending factors
supplied by ISO), the insurer's actuarial department applies
various statistical techniques to produce estimates of the total
future loss payments attributable to outstanding insurance
policies. Typically, the actuaries will recommend a range of
Then someone in management will
"reasonable" reserves.
choose the final number to be reported on the insurer's annual
statement. The important point is this: At every stage of the
process, employees of the insurer-claims adjusters, actuaries,
and managers-exercise a considerable degree of discretion. 66
In theory, if loss reserves were determined strictly in
accordance with insurance-accounting theory, the reserve would
reflect only those factors that bear on the size, frequency, and
pattern of future claim payments and claim-expense payments.67
In practice, however, given the amount of discretion inherent in
the loss-reserving process and the various reporting functions
that the loss reserve performs, one would expect reserves to be
influenced by considerations not strictly related to estimated
liability. For example, in choosing a loss reserve to report on its
annual statement, management is likely to be sensitive to the
effect of the report on all of the relevant audiences to whom it
is sent, including state insurance regulators, investors, and tax
collectors. 68
66 See DOJ Report, Pricing and Marketing, supra note 39, at 50 ("[T]he formulation
of rates involves a substantial element of judgment. The bureau rate represents the
collective judgment of a large number of competing insurers, aided by a professional
staff of actuaries, as to the average future losses and expenses for the industry."). The
rate making process and the loss-reserving process are inextricably linked: An insurer
must have calculated its loss reserves to be able to calculate its premiums.
67 Such factors include changes in patterns of actual claim payments, changes in
inflation rates, weather patterns, technological developments, and, most significant in
the context of liability of insurance, trends in tort doctrine and jury awards that affect
the size and frequency of liability judgments.
68 Troxel & Bouchie, supra note 61, at 2-3 (discussing fact that different audiences
for annual statement have different objectives and look for different things in the
statement); Lacey, supra note 37, at 504 ("Another example of profitability's
ambiguity and manipulability is the way loss reserves are reported. Loss reserves
measure the insurer's liability for unpaid claims and are estimated through actuarial
methods. Once appropriate levels for loss reserves are reported, however, reserves
may be deliberately misstated in either direction. Understating loss reserves overstates
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To see why this is so, consider the following simple example.
Imagine an insurer that overstates its loss-reserve deduction in
Year 1 by $100. This reduces its Year 1 taxable income by $100;
and, if we assume a constant tax rate of 46 percent, the
overstated deduction saves the insurer $46 in Year 1. Suppose
that in Year 5 it becomes clear that the reserve has been
overstated. (For example, the actual claim payment is made in
Year 5, and it turns out to be $100 less than was originally
reserved.) In Year 5, then, the insurer would have to weaken
(or reduce) its reserve by $100 and therefore would have to
include that amount in its Year 5 taxable income. Assuming a
tax rate of 46 percent throughout the example, the overstated
portion of the loss-reserve deduction would decrease the
insurer's tax liability by $46 in Year 1 but would increase the
insurer's tax liability by $46 in Year 5, allowing the insurer to
postpone paying the $46 tax liability for four years. This allows
the insurer to capture the time value of the postponed payment,
because the insurer rather than the IRS gets the interest earned
on the invested tax savings.69
It is worth pausing here to note that an insurer can get the
above-described tax-deferral benefit not only by overstating the
initial reserve for a given accident year but also by revising
upward-that is, by strengthening-loss reserves for prior
accident years. Thus, if the insurer in our example had also
written a policy in Year 0 that was identical to the policy written
in Year 1, the insurer in Year 1 could have strengthened its
Accident-Year 0 reserve by $100, which would have produced
the same $46 in tax savings as overstating the Accident-Year 1
reserve would have.10 This ability to use reserve strengthenings
profit and gives the impression that the firm is in better financial condition than it
actually is. Thus, insurance firms that are suffering financially have an incentive to
understate reserves and conceal the firm's financial distress. Correlatively, overstating
reserves understates profit, reduces the insurer's tax liability, and increases the
insurer's cash flow.").
69 This tax benefit would be eliminated, of course, if the insurer were required to pay
interest to the IRS on the amount of taxes deferred.
But there is no such
requirement. Note one implication of this analysis: A reserve that is overstated (or
conservatively estimated) when initially reported is more likely to be weakened in
subsequent reporting years than is an unbiased reserve.
10 However, with the reserve strengthening for the Year 0 accident year, the $46 in
tax savings would probably come back into income one year earlier than would be the
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to reduce taxes will become important in Part III, when we look
at the data. It is also important to emphasize that the tax
benefit of overstating loss reserves is a function of the insurer's
marginal tax rate, the relevant discount rate, and the length of
the delay between the initial reserve-deduction and the later
reserve-inclusion. The higher the insurer's marginal tax rate, the
larger will be the amount of taxes that can be deferred by the
deduction. In the example above, if the insurer had been taxed
at a rate of 70 percent, the overstated reserve deduction would
have deferred $70 rather than $46. Also, the higher the discount
rate and the longer the period of deferral, the greater would be
the value of deferring $46 in tax liability.
One interesting
implication of this is that the tax benefit of overstated loss
reserve deductions is greatest for the long-tail lines of
coverage-such
as
Medical
Malpractice
and
Other
Liability-since those lines allow for the longest period of
deferral.
Because of the tax benefit of conservative loss reserving, there
has long been a tax-based incentive for property-casualty
insurers to overstate their loss reserves. Should we therefore
expect property-casualty insurers always to overstate their loss
reserves? The answer is no, and the reason is simple: Reported
loss reserves convey information to a number of different
audiences. Therefore, a number of nontax factors may bias
reported loss reserves downward, offsetting the tax incentive that
may bias them upward. For example, in some years insurance
company management may have an overwhelming incentive to
understate the company's loss reserves (that is, to reserve
optimistically) so as to boost the company's reported eamings.11
Management might do this to maximize its compensation (which
may be tied to annual profits), to suggest a surge in profitability
immediately before going to the capital markets, or to smooth
reported earnings over time.
In addition to these external limits, the tax incentive to
overstate loss reserves also is limited, albeit only weakly, by the
threat of IRS scrutiny. The IRS can disallow a property-casualty
insurer's loss-reserve deduction to the extent that it is
case if the insurer had overstated the Year 1 accident year reserves.
11 Lacey, supra note 37, at 504.
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unreasonable.12 At the extreme, the IRS has the authority to
impose penalties for grossly overstated loss reserves.
For
example, if the Service were to determine that the insurer
intentionally overstated its reserves to avoid taxes, it could
impose penalties for fraud. In practice, however, the Service
never imposes such fraud penalties on insurers; indeed, the IRS
almost
never
disallows
reserve-deductions
as
being
unreasonable.73
To summarize, there are a number of external factors that can
be expected to bias insurance-company loss reserves, including
tax, financial, and regulatory incentives. As a result, depending
upon the relative strength of each factor, an insurer's reported
loss reserve for any given accident year may be overstated or
understated or substantially unbiased. Because these incentives
are interrelated, if the basis of any one of them were to undergo
an unusual change, a shift in the direction of the overall loss
reserving bias would be expected to occur. In Sections B and C,
I will describe the transition in the federal income tax laws that
occurred in the mid-1980s which dramatically altered the balance
of external incentives affecting property-casualty insurers' loss
reserving decisions. First, in Section B, I will explain the pre-'86
Act tax treatment .of loss-reserve deductions, which in effect
provided a considerable hidden subsidy to the property-casualty
industry. Then, in Section C, I will discuss the way in which the
proposal to change the tax treatment of property-casualty loss
reserves (together with the proposal to lower corporate income
tax rates) increased insurers' incentive to overstate (and
decreased their incentive to understate) their loss reserves in
1984, 1985, and 1986.

Treas. Reg. § 1.832-l(b) (1996).
In addition, even if the reserve deduction is challenged as being unreasonably
large, the IRS at most will only disallow the unreasonable portion of the deduction.
The insurer will be permitted at least to deduct the reasonable portion. Cf. Richard
Morais, Discounting the Downtrodden, Forbes, Feb. 25, 1985, at 82-83 ("It is virtually
impossible on a case-by-case basis to prove reserve redundancy . . . . I've never met an
IRS official who was able to do all the work.") (quoting Larry Coleman, analyst for
National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
n
73
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B. Pre-'86 Act Taxation of Property-Casualty Loss Reserves:
A Hidden Subsidy

As mentioned above, Subchapter L of the Internal Revenue
Code has historically permitted property-casualty insurers to use
the statutory method of accounting for purposes of calculating
their federal income tax liability. However, statutory accounting
tends to overstate an insurer's liabilities (supposedly in the
interest of protecting policyholders); therefore, statutory
accounting-compared with traditional tax accounting-tends to
understate the insurer's annual income. Because of the
differences between statutory accounting and standard tax
accounting, the property-casualty industry (until the '86 Act)
enjoyed a number of tax-deferral opportunities not available to
other taxpayers.74
One of the largest of these pre-'86 Act tax preferences was the
treatment of loss reserves. Before the '86 Act, Subchapter L
permitted property-casualty insurers to use undiscounted loss
reserves in calculating their federal taxable income. This
practice had the potential to produce drastically overstated loss
reserve deductions and understated tax liabilities, even ifinsurers
were unbiased in their loss-reserving decisions. Put differently,
the use of undiscounted loss reserves permitted property-casualty
insurers to report losses for federal income tax purposes on
transactions that were profitable if measured in terms of nominal
economic income.1s These losses could then be used to shelter
the insurers' income from other sources. To illustrate how this
tax preference worked, the following example contrasts the pre
'86 Act treatment of loss reserves and the treatment that would
exist under a tax on nominal economic income.

74 For a discussion of several ways in which pre-'86 Act statutory accounting
essentially provided a subsidy to the property-casualty industry, see generally GAO
Report, supra note 62, at 11-21 (explaining how the method of calculating loss reserves
systematically "understates the periodic determination of income," thereby allowing
substantial tax deferral).
1s Under a tax on nominal economic income, the tax base would include any net
increase in a taxpayer's wealth or net worth during a given period of time (typically
a year) without controlling for inflation. In contrast, a tax on economic income
(sometimes called Haig-Simons income) would control for inflation. This distinction
was pointed out to me by David Bradford.
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For the purposes of this example, make the following
assumptions: A single property-casualty insurance company sells
one policy on January 1, Year 1. The policy is issued and the
full premium is received on that date. The policy has a term of
one year, during which an insured loss-event occurs. According
to the unbiased calculations of the insurer's actuaries, this single
loss-event will require the insurer to make one claim payment of
$1,000 in five years (on December 31, Year 5). The insurance
company has no administrative expenses and therefore sets the
premium for the policy equal to the discounted value of the
single loss payment to be made in five years.76 The insurer
invests the premium at a before-tax rate of ten percent, com
pounded continuously. All company earnings are retained and
reinvested at that rate. Finally, assume that the insurer charges
a premium equal to $607.03, which is the amount the insurer
would need to receive in Year 1 to be able to generate $1,000 by
the end of Year 5 under the assumptions of the example. The
applicable federal income tax rate is assumed to be forty-six
percent throughout the example.11
The question, then, is how much taxable income the
transaction produces for the insurer. Note that the insurer
76 The assumptions of this example obviously depart substantially from the reality of
an actual insurance policy. In the real world there is always some degree of
uncertainty or risk either as to the magnitude, probability, frequency, or timing of any
potential loss payments. Because the tax-law changes addressed in this article affect
only issues of timing (and not of risk), the assumptions of certainty and of a single loss
payment do not affect the conclusions of the analysis.
For a more technical
development of this simplified example, see David F. Bradford & Kyle D. Logue, The
Effects of Tax-Law Changes on Prices in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry
(NBER Working Paper) (June 1996) (on file with Virginia Law Review Association).
That article provides a detailed taxonomy that captures the basic economics of the
timing aspect of an insurance contract. We start with the concept of a "single
payment spot policy," which is comparable to the example in the text above: a single
loss event that gives rise to a premium being received and fully earned upon issuance
of the policy. We then describe a generic "spot policy," which introduces a stream of
loss payments over time (again the amount and timing of the payments being certain).
Finally we develop the idea of a "standard policy," which comes closest to describing
a typical property-casualty insurance policy. A standard policy is a bundle of spot
policies or, more precisely, a contract under which the insurer agrees, at the beginning
of the policy period, to fund loss events whenever they occur during the policy period
by issuing spot policies.
11 For an explanation of why it is appropriate to calculate the break-even premium
using the before-tax discount rate, see Bradford & Logue, supra note 76, at App. A.
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would earn interest every year on the invested premium (and on
the reinvested retained earnings) until the payment was made in
Year 5. Observe also that both the premium received in Year
1 and the interest earned on that premium would be offset by
the increase in the nominal value of the insurer's liability to
make the $1,000 payment to the insured in Year 5. Under
plausible assumptions, that liability would have a present value
at the beginning of Year 1 of $607.03, precisely offsetting the
premium received; and the value of that liability would grow in
value each year (in precisely the amount of the before-tax
interest earned on the premium) as the time to make the
Therefore, under an ideal nominal
payment grew nearer.
economic-income tax, this transaction would produce no income
or loss for the insurer. This makes sense because, under the
assumptions of the example, the insurer broke even on the
deal.78
One accounting technique that would approximate nominal
economic-income taxation would be to allow insurers to take
loss-reserve deductions each year but to require them to
discount those deductions to present value.
Under this
approach, the insurer would include the premium in income
when received and earned79 and would include the interest
earnings on the invested premium in the year in which those
interest earnings accrued. The insurer, however, would then be
permitted each year to deduct only the discounted present value
of the net annual increase in its loss reserves. Applying this
accounting treatment in our example, the insurer would report
no taxable income and no tax loss, which is the appropriate
result under the assumptions. The approach is illustrated in
Table 1.1. Note that the present value to the insurer of this
transaction in Year 1 would be zero. That is what is meant by
a break-even transaction.
1s The nominal-economic-income approach would not necessarily produce a loss
reserve deduction that would perfectly offset the insurer's interest earnings. In the
example, I have assumed that the discount rate used to determine the present value
of the loss reserve each year will be the same as the interest rate at which the insurer
would invest the collected premium. In fact, those rates could differ significantly.
This assumption, however, does not affect my conclusions.
79 Received premiums are earned pro rata over the course of the policy period.
Mooney & Cohen, supra note 4, at 22.
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1.1

Nominal-Economic-Income Taxation: Loss-Reserve Deduction Using Discounted Reserves
Year l

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year s

Income

(1) Premiums

$607.03

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$63.74

$70.43

$77.83

$86.00

$95.03

$670.77

$70.43

$77.83

$86.00

$95.03

(4) End of year reserve

$670.77

$74120

$819.02

$905.02

(5) Increase in reserve

$670.77

$77.83
$0.00

$86.00

$0.00

$70.43
$0.00

$0.00

$1,000.00

$670.77

$70.43

$77.83

$86.00

$94.98

Net taxable income<

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.05d

Tax liabilitye

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

(2) Investment income
(3) Total income•
Expenses

(6) Loss payments
(7) Loss reserve deductionb

$0.00
($905.02)

(inclusion)

• Row (3)

=

(1)

+

(2)

b Row (7)

=

(5)

+

(6)

c

[Row (3) - Row (7)]

d The net taxable income in Year 5 would actually be zero. The five cent discrepancy in the
Table comes from a rounding error.
•

46% of net taxable income

A loss-reserve discounting approach that approximates
nominal-economic-income taxation was enacted as part of the
'86 Act. This approach is discussed below in Section C. Before
the '86 Act, however, property-casualty insurers were permitted
to use undiscounted loss-reserve deductions for federal income
tax purposes. The use of undiscounted loss-reserve deductions
for federal income tax purposes produced a large tax savings to
property-casualty insurers in comparison to the nominal
economic-income approach. Table 1.2 illustrates this effect.
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Table 1.2
Pre-'86 Act Taxation: Loss-Reserve Deduction Using Undiscounted Reserves
Year l

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year s

$607.03

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$63.74

$70.43

$77.83

$86.00

$95.03

Income

(1) Premiums
(2) Investment income
(a) on premiumgenerated assets
(b) on net tax-refund assets

$0.00

$9.34

$7.69

$5.73

$3.47

$63.74

$79.77

$85.52

$91.73

$98.50

$670.77

$79.77

$85.52

$91.73

$98.50

(4) End of year reserve

$1,000.00

$1,000.00

$1,000.00

$1,000.00

$0.00

(5) Increase in reserve

$1,000.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

($1,000.00)

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$1,000.00

$1,000.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00
$98.50

(c) subtotal
(3) Total income•
Expenses

(6) Loss payments
(7) Loss reserve deductionb
(inclusion)
Net taxable incomec

($329.23)

$79.77

$85.52

$91.73

Tax liability!

($151.45)

$36.70

$39.34

$4220

$45.31

$82221

$43.08

$46.18

$49.53

($946.81)

Cash flow
• Row (3)
b Row (7)

=

(1)

=

(5) +

+

(2)
(6)

[Row (3) - Row (7)]
d 46% of net taxable income
c

According to Table 1.2, and maintaining all the same
assumptions as before, the undiscounted loss-reserve deduction
in Year 1 would produce a tax loss in that year-$329.23 in the
example. That loss in turn would generate a tax refund in Year
1, assuming the insurer has income from other sources that can
be sheltered. In the example, the amount of that refund would
be $151.45 in Year 1, which is then reinvested by the insurer at
10 percent before taxes, compounded continuously. The
earnings on that investment are then taxed at the insurer's
marginal rate of 46 percent. At the end of the five-year period,
because of the tax savings created in Year 1, the transaction
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(which is a break-even-zero profit-deal in nominal economic
terms) produces a positive after-tax cash flow to the insurer over
the course of 5 years that has a present value (in Year 1) of
approximately $184. Because of the nature of discounting, the
size of the tax savings would increase as the length of the tail of
the insurance increases and as the interest rate increases.so
C.

Tax Reform: The Loss-Reserve Discounting Requirement
and the Reduction in Corporate Rates

In the early 1980s, there was an extreme and widely shared
dissatisfaction with the federal income tax laws.s1 Largely in
response to these concerns, a movement began during this
period (both in Congress and in the Treasury Department) to
reform the federal income tax system. By 1984 the leading tax
reform proposals had a common theme: to reduce (or flatten)
so The pre-'86 Act tax treatment of property-casualty loss reserves not only diverged
from nominal-economic-income taxation but also diverged from standard tax
accounting principles. Under the rules of tax accounting, non-insurance company
taxpayers who use the accrual method of accounting are not permitted to establish
reserves for future expenses and to deduct those reserves currently-discounted or
undiscounted. Rather, those taxpayers are permitted to deduct a liability only when
the "all events" test is satisfied-that is, only when (a) all of the events necessary to
fix the liability have occurred and (b) the amount of the liability can be determined
with reasonable accuracy. Thus, for example, whereas a liability insurer would have
been allowed to deduct currently the undiscounted value of a tort claim payment that
it expected to have to pay in some future year arising out of policies written in the
current year (even if the claim had not yet been reported), a non-insurance company
taxpayer would be allowed to deduct that expense only when the all events test was
satisfied-which would be several years later, when the tort claim was filed and the
jury decision was rendered (or the case settled). See generally Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 600-05
(1987) [hereinafter Bluebook 1986] (explaining the different treatment of property
casualty insurers under prior law and outlining the reasons for the 1986 changes).
Moreover, for all liabilities incurred after 1984, no non-insurance company taxpayer
may deduct a liability until "economic performance" has occurred with respect to that
liability. l.R.C. § 461(h) (enacted as part of The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., (1984)). With respect to liabilities arising out of tort,
workers' compensation, or contract claims, the economic performance requirement is
satisfied only when the taxpayer actually makes payment to the party to whom the
liability is owed. l.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(c) (1994) and Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g) (1996). In
other words, for such liabilities, all non-insurance company taxpayers have, since 1984,
been placed on the cash method of accounting.
81 Michael J. Graetz, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 27 (2d ed.
1988) ("The federal income tax was increasingly criticized in the 1980's as inequitable,
economically inefficient, and unnecessarily complex.").
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income tax rates and to broaden the tax base by eliminating the
numerous "loopholes" that had previously enabled some
taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities drastically. One of the
most prominent of these proposals appeared in November 1984,
in a three-volume document issued by the Treasury Department,
entitled Report to the President, Tax Reform for Fairness,
Simplicity, and Economic Growth.82 This report is sometimes
referred to as Treasury I. In addition, only a few months later,
the Office of the President submitted The President's Tax
Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity,
which also contained numerous proposals designed to broaden
the tax base and flatten rates. This report is sometimes called
Treasury JJ.83 Finally, when the '86 Act was enacted in October
1986, versions of many of the proposals from Treasury I and
Treasury II became law.
Two particular changes in the '86 Act are central to the tax
based explanation of the insurance crisis: (a) the introduction of
the loss-reserve discounting requirement and (b) the reduction in
corporate income tax rates. In the examples that follow, I will
explain how these two changes, had they been anticipated by
insurers before the enactment of the '86 Act, would have in
creased the incentive to overstate loss reserves. But first, let me
sullllall rize the two relevant changes.
First, there was the loss-reserve discounting requirement.
Under the '86 Act, for all tax years after December 31, 1986,
loss-reserve deductions and inclusions for property-casualty
companies are determined by taking the difference between the
discounted value of the insurer's total loss reserves at the end of
the preceding year and the discounted value of the reserves at
the end of the current year.84 In addition, a special transition
rule-called the fresh start-was inserted in the '86 Act. This
rule essentially permitted insurers a second deduction (spread
out over a number of years) equal to the difference between the
discounted value and the undiscounted value of the total year82 1 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the President, (1984) [hereinafter
Treasury I].
83 Office of the President, The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for
Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity (1985) [hereinafter Treasury II].
84 I.R.C. §§ 832, 846 (1994).
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end 1986 loss reserves.ss Second, the '86 Act reduced the top
marginal tax rate for corporations from forty-six percent to
thirty-four percent; and the new rate was phased in over two
years-forty percent in 1987 and thirty-four percent in 1988 and
thereafter.86
These changes would have given insurers an incentive to
overstate their loss reserves in 1984, 1985, and 1986. This is
because under the new discounting rules, overstated loss-reserve
deductions in those years would have been taken at their undis
counted value, whereas the subsequent loss-reserve inclusions (if
necessary to correct the earlier conservatism) would occur at
their discounted value. Moreover, because of the fresh start
provision, insurers were permitted to deduct a second time the
difference between the undiscounted and the discounted value
of their 1986 year-end total loss reserves. And finally, owing to
the drop in corporate rates, overstated loss-reserve deductions
in 1984-86 would have shifted a substantial amount of
underwriting income from tax years in which the top corporate
rate was forty-six percent to tax years in which the top corporate
rate was thirty-four percent. All of these effects, and the
transitional incentive they created, are illustrated in the
following example.
Imagine a property-casualty insurance company that writes a
single liability policy at the beginning of 1985-the year before
the '86 Act was enacted. Next, assume that the insurer
determines that this policy will give rise to only one claim and
that this claim will be for $1,000, which will have to be paid in
ss The fresh-start provision, Pub. L. No. 99-514, tit. X, § 1023(e)(3), 100 Stat. 2404
(1986), was an alternative to I.R.C. § 481's standard treatment of changes in
accounting methods. When there is a change in accounting methods that would
otherwise permit double-deductions, § 481(a) provides the method by which this
transitional effect is reduced or eliminated. Absent the fresh-start rule in the '86 Act,
§ 481(a) would have required all property-casualty insurers either to include the
amount of the 1986 discount (i.e., the total difference between the discounted and the
undiscounted value of all reserves outstanding at the end of 1986) into income in the
1986 tax year or at least to include that amount in income over a period of years. The
fresh-start rule, however, allowed the so-called double-deduction. To see how this
double-deduction works, see infra Table 2.2. This especially generous change-of
accounting rule for property-casualty insurers may have been intended by Congress
to serve as a form of transition relief to compensate insurers partially for the otherwise
unfavorable (from the industry's perspective) changes contained in the '86 Act.
86 Pub. L. No. 99-514, tit. X, § 601(b), 100 Stat. 2249 (1986).
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five years (on December 31, 1989) . As discussed above in
connection with Tables 1.1 and 1.2, even without the tax-reform
proposals mentioned above, the insurer would have had a tax
incentive in 1985 to overstate its 1985-accident-year reserve so
as to get the time value of the overstated portion of the
deduction.
For example, the insurer might have had an
incentive to report a $1,100 reserve for the 1985-accident-year
rather than an unbiased $ 1,000 reserve, because doing so would
allow the insurer to capture the time value of the extra $100
deduction for five years. However, precisely because of the
possibility of the two tax-reform proposals mentioned above
(i.e., the discounting requirement and the drop in corporate
rates) , the incentive to overstate the loss-reserve deduction
substantially increased in 1985 because the net present value of
overstating the reserve was much greater in that year than in
previous years.
To see why this is so, suppose that the insurer was considering
reporting a conservative 1985 reserve of $1 ,100 (which, we are
assuming, is $100 greater than the unbiased reserve would have
been) .
The extra $100 loss-reserve deduction-given the
possibility of tax reform-would be taken on an undiscounted
basis and would have offset income that was taxed at forty-six
percent. In addition, when the $100 had to be returned to
income in 1989 (when it was learned definitively that the loss
payment would be only $1,000 and not $ 1,100) , the $100 loss
reserve inclusion would be taxed at the rates prevailing at the
time (thirty-four percent in 1989) and would have been returned
to income at the discounted value.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the increased tax-incentive to
overstate loss reserves created by the expectation of tax reform.
First, Table 2.1 demonstrates the tax-benefit of reporting a
$1 ,100 loss reserve for the 1985 reporting year, assuming no '86
Act. Then, Table 2.2 shows the increased tax-benefit of the
same loss-reserve deduction, once the '86 Act is added to the

analysis.
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Table 2.1
Pre-'86 Act Taxation (No Tax Reform): Overstated Loss-Reserve Deduction
1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

$607.03

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$63.74

$70.43

$77.83

$86.00

$95.03

Income
(1) Premiums
(2) Investment income

(a) on premiumgenerated assets

$0.00

$12.24

$10.64

$8.78

$6.62

$63.74

$82.67

$88.47

$94.78

$101.65

$670.77

$82.67

$88.47

$94.78

$101.65

(4) End of-year reserve

$1,100.00

$1,100.00

$1,100.00

$1,100.00

(5) Increase in reserve

$1,100.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

($1,100.00)

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$1,000.00

$1,100.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

($100.00)

$82.67

$88.47 .

$94.78

$201.65

(b) on net tax-refund assets
(c) subtotal
(3) Total income•
Expenses

(6) Loss payments
(7) Loss reserve deductionb

$0.00

(inclusion)
Net taxable income<

($42923)

Tax liability!

($197.45)

$38.03

$40.70

$43.60

$92.76

$868.21

$44.64

$47.77

$51.18

($991.11)

Cash flow
• Row (3)

=

Row (7)

=

(5) + (6)

d Row (9)

=

46% of net taxable income

b
c

(1)

+

(2)

[Row (3) - Row (7)]

Note that the $1,100 reserve-deduction in Year 1 generated a
positive cash flow to the insurer, the present value of which in
Year 1 was $198. That is roughly $14, in present value terms,
more than if the insurer had not overstated the reserve in 1985,
assuming no change in the tax rules (and, of course, $198 more
than the present value of this transaction under nominal
economic-income taxation) . This can be seen by comparing
Table 2.1 to Table 1.2, which demonstrates that, under
assumptions essentially the same as those applied here, a reserve
deduction of $1,000 in 1985 would produce a positive cash flow
to the insurer worth $184.
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Table 2.2, however, introduces the '86 Act to the analysis.
With the enactment of the '86 Act, whereas a reserve deduction
taken in 1985 would offset income that would have been taxed
at the 46-percent corporate rate, all post-'86 reserve inclusions
would be taxed at the lower corporate rates that apply to income
earned in those years. Also, because of the fresh-start rule
(included in the '86 Act) , the insurer gets to deduct (again) the
difference between the discounted value of the 1986 year-end
reserve and the $1,000 loss payment that is actually made.
Table 2.2
Pre- and Post-'86 Act Taxation (With Tax Reform): Overstated Loss Reserve Deduction
1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

$607.03

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$63.74

$70.43

$77.83

$86.00

$95.03

$0.00

$12.24

$10.64

$1052

$10.41

Income
(1) Premiums
(2) Investment income

(a) on premiumgenerated assets
{b) on net tax-refund assets

(c) subtotal
(3) Total income•

$63.74

$82.67

$88.47

$9652

$105.44

$670.77

$82.67

$88.47

$9652

$105.44

Expenses
(4) End of year reserve

$1,100.00

$918.96

$975.94

$1,036.45

(5) Increase in reserve

$1,100.00

($181.04)

$56.98

$6051

{$1,036.45)
$1,000.00

(6) Loss payments
(7) Loss reserve deductionb

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$1,100.00

$0.00

$56.98

$6051

($36.45)
$141.89

(Inclusion)
Net taxable incomec

($429.23)

$82.67

$31.49

$36.01

Tax liability'

($197.45)

$38.03

$12.60

$1224

$4824

$86821

$44.64

$75.87

$8428

($942.80)

Cash flow
• Row (3) = Rows (1)

+

(2)

b Row (7) = Rows (5)

+

(6)

[Row (3) Row (7)]
d Row (9) = 46% of net taxable income for 1985-86, 40% for 1987, 34% for 1988-90
c

-

As a result of these transitional effects, the insurer who
reported an overstated loss reserve of $1,100 in 1985 would have
generated a positive after-tax cash flow with a present value of
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$284. As it turns out, this amount is $29 more than the present
value of the cash flow that would have been generated had the
insurer not overstated its 1985 reserve under the assumptions of
this example. (That is, had the insurer in Table 2.2 set up an
initial 1985 reserve of only $1,000 instead of $1,100, the total
cash flow generated by the 1985 reserve deduction would have
produced a present value of $255.) Therefore, the introduction
of
the
'86
Act-with
its
accompanying
transitional
effects-increased the tax benefit of a $100 reserve
overstatement in the 1985 reporting year by $15. That is the
difference between $14 (the present value of the overstatement
without tax reform) and $29 (the present value of the
overstatement with tax reform). That difference amounts to
more than a doubling of the tax benefit of overstating the
reserve in this particular example.
In sum, the tax-law changes proposed for property-casualty
loss reserves and for corporate tax rates gave property-casualty
insurers an increased incentive to overstate (i.e., to increase the
level of conservatism in) their reported loss-reserve deductions.
Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that these tax-based
incentives existed in 1984, 1985, and 1986, as the proposals to
reduce corporate rates and to require reserve discounting were
seriously being considered by Congress throughout this period.
This conclusion is reasonable because a substantial reduction in
the corporate tax rates was an essential feature in every major
tax-reform proposal considered by Congress in the mid-1980s
(including, of course, the '86 Act). Treasury I, announced in
November 1984, contained a proposal to replace the existing
corporate rate schedule-which included a top rate of forty-six
percent87-with a single thirty-three percent rate on corporate

fr1 For taxable years beginning in 1983 (and continuing until the effective date of the
'86 Act), the taxable income of corporations was subject to a graduated rate-structure
that taxed most corporate income at a marginal rate of 46 percent. The 46 percent
rate applied to all corporate taxable income in excess of $100,000. The lower rates
applied as follows: 15% on corporate income from 0 to $25,000; 18% from $25,001 to
$50,000; 30% from $50,001 to $75,000; and 40% from $75,001 to $100,000. Beginning
in 1984, an additional 5% tax was imposed on corporate income between $1,000,000
and $1,405,000, which yielded a maximum additional tax of $20,250 and was designed
to phase out the benefit of the graduated rates for corporations. Bluebook 1986, supra
note 80, at 271.
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income.88 Treasury II, submitted to Congress in May of 1985,
proposed replacing the existing corporate rate schedule with a
much flatter version, which would also have included a top rate
of thirty-three percent.89 Moreover, the other two major tax
reform bills under consideration at the time-the Bradley
Gephart bill and the Kemp-Kasten bill-would also have
reduced corporate rates substantially.90 In the end, the corporate
income tax rate schedule enacted as part of the '86 Act included
a top rate (after all "phaseouts" and "bubbles") of thirty-four
percent, and this new rate was phased in over two years.
Consequently, most corporate taxable income earned in 1984,
1985, and 1986 was taxed at forty-six percent; whereas, most
1987 corporate income was taxed at forty percent; and most 1988
corporate income was taxed at thirty-four percent.91 Owing to
the relative uniformity of the reform proposals, unless property
casualty insurers had their heads in the sand, they could have
seen a change in corporate rates coming in 1984, in 1985, and
obviously in 1986.
Also in 1984-86, property-casualty insurers could have easily
foreseen (and begun to plan for) the new loss-reserve
discounting requirement. In a June 1983 hearing before the
Senate Finance Committee, it was first suggested-both by a
high-ranking official in the Treasury Department and one in the
General Accounting Office-that the federal income tax
treatment of property-casualty loss reserves should be changed
to eliminate the tax-deferral effect caused by the undiscounted
loss-reserve deduction. For example, then-Assistant Secretary

2 Treasury I, supra note 82, at 129.
The lower rates under Treasury II would have applied as follows: 15% on taxable
income up to $25,000; 18% on income between $25,000 and $50,000; and 25% on
income between $50,000 and $75,000. The graduated rate was to be phased out,
beginning at $140,000, so that all corporations with taxable income of more than
$360,000 would, in effect, pay a flat rate of 33% . Treasury II, supra note 83, at 119.
oo The Bradley-Gephart bill would have replaced the old rate schedule with a flat
rate of 30 percent; the Kemp-Kasten bill would have imposed a 35% rate on all
corporate taxable income over $100,000 (with 15% and 25% brackets for lower levels
of income). Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Corporate
Taxation 3 (Joint Comm. Print 1985).
91 Bluebook 1986, supra note 80, at 272. The corporate rate schedule for the 1987
taxable year was a blend of the 1986 rates and the 1988 rates. For a description of
how the blended rates were calculated for each bracket, see id. at 272-73.
ss
89

932

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 82:895

of the Treasury for Tax Policy John Chapoton gave the
following testimony before the Committee in 1983:
We believe that the current tax rules which permit insurance
companies to deduct the undiscounted estimate of their future
claims are seriously flawed. First, allowing deductions based on
estimates of future claims encourages taxpayers to adopt
procedures for making estimates that tend to overstate the
amount of claims which actually will be paid. It is difficult to
audit and evaluate the various procedures employed by
individual companies. Second, and more significant, these rules
effectively permit these taxpayers to deduct currently amounts
that are properly allocable to future periods, thereby sheltering
other income that otherwise would be taxed currently. This is
roughly equivalent to allowing the investment income earned on
the portion of the premium amount set aside to pay claims to
build up free from tax. This unsound result occurs whenever a
taxpayer takes a full deduction for future expenses, whether or
not the expense has technically accrued.92

Also, in his testimony� Assistant Secretary Chapoton noted
two alternative solutions to the loss-reserving problem: (a)
requiring loss-reserve deductions and inclusions to be discounted
to present value; or (b) delaying the deductions until actual loss
claim payments were made (that is, putting property-casualty
insurers on the cash method).93
In early 1984 the GAO
circulated a draft report to members of the property-casualty
industry as well as to the Treasury Department that included a
loss-reserve discounting proposal. That report was made public
in March of 1985.94 Also in 1984 the Treasury Department
92 Taxation of Property Casualty Insurance Companies, Hearing Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1983) (Statement of John E. Chapoton,
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of Treasury) (footnote omitted); see
also id. at 68 (Statement of Harry Havens, Assistant Comptroller General for Program
Evaluation, GAO) ("[O]n the loss reserve deduction, we share the views of the
Treasury that deducting the gross amount on an undiscounted basis is a significant
violation of economic income as a basis for taxation.").
93 Id. at 54 (statement of John E. Chapoton).
94 GAO Report, supra note 62 (dated Mar. 25, 1985).
The recommendations
contained in the report were unambiguous. The report twice stated that
There is a growing tax deferral resulting from the current mismatching of
revenues and expenses of the property and casualty insurance industry. If the
Congress wishes to assure that the industry's revenues and expenses be more
closely matched for purposes of measuring taxable income, it should consider
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issued Treasury I, which contained a detailed version of the
discounting requirement similar to the one proposed by the
GA0.9s Then Treasury II came out, recommending an .even
less-generous version of the reserve discounting requirement that
would have essentially placed all property-casualty insurers on
the cash method with respect to their loss reserves.96 Although
the Treasury I, Treasury II, and GAO proposals differed from
each other in several respects, each called for the same basic
change with regard to property-casualty loss reserves: Loss
reserve deductions were to be (actually or effectively) discounted
to present value for federal income tax purposes.97 Ultimately,
a version of the discounting requirement-most similar to the
one proposed by GAO-was enacted as part of the '86 Act.98
Given this legislative history, it is extremely likely that in 1984
and 1985 (and certainly in 1986) property-casualty insurers were
beginning to see the writing on the wall with respect to the
discounting requirement. The loss-reserve reform proposals
were no secret to the property-casualty industry. In fact, a
number of property-casualty industry representatives offered
testimony at the 1983 hearings before the Senate Finance
Committee dealing with the tax treatment of property-casualty
insurers.99 In addition, in early 1984 the GAO's discounting
proposal was widely circulated for comment to officials in the
property-casualty industry.HJO Unsurprisingly, on both occasions
the industry representatives vigorously opposed the discounting
amending the tax code to provide that, in calculating the loss reserve deduction
for tax purposes, loss reserves are discounted.
Id. at v, 21.
95 1 Treasury I, supra note 82, at 134 (citing "excessive deductions . . . inconsistent
with a comprehensive income tax" and recommending changes); and 2 Treasury I,
supra note 82, at 273-77.
96 Treasury II, supra note 83, at 266-73.
VT For a discussion of the distinctions between the GAO, Treasury I and Treasury
II proposals with respect to property-casualty loss reserves, see Staff of the Joint
Comm. on Taxation, supra note 62, at 32-40.
98 See Bluebook 1986, supra note 80, at 601-02.
99 Feds Examine Insurance Tax Policy, Risk Management, Aug. 1983, at 8.
See
generally GAO Report, supra note 62, at app. IV (groups who testified included
Alliance of American Insurers, National Association of Independent Insurers, and
American Insurance Association).
100 Mary Jane Fisher, P&C Tax Study Questions Loss Reserves, Expenses, Nat'l
Underwriter: Prop. & Casualty Ins. Ed., Feb. 3, 1984, at 1, 43.

934

Virginia Law Review

[Vol.

82:895

proposals. 101 Notwithstanding the industry's sustained opposition
to the discounting proposals, however, there is evidence that the
insurers had already begun to resign themselves to some type of
discounting requirement. 102
It is unclear in which of the relevant years-1984, 1985, or
1986-the incentive to increase loss reserves would have been
the greatest. It could be argued that the incentive was strongest
in 1986. Only in 1986 did the passage of the '86 Act become a
certainty. Thus, to the extent property-casualty insurers were
reluctant to alter their loss-reserving based on an anticipated
change in the law, the big year of tax-induced overreserving
would have been 1986. Also, the existence of the fresh-start
transition rule may have enhanced the tax incentive to overstate
reserves in 1986. Recall that the fresh-start rule permitted, in
effect, a second deduction for the amount of an insurer's
aggregate reserve discount for the 1986 reporting year. (See
Table 2.2) . Thus, in the 1986 reporting year, insurers had an
101 See Alliance of American Insurers, National Association of Independent Insurers,
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and Reinsurance Association
of America, in GAO Report, supra note 62, at 78-82 (comments concerning proposed
draft of GAO Report); Steven Brostoff, Loss Reserve Treatment Tops List of Industry
Tax Plan Complaints, Nat'l Underwriter: Prop. & Casualty Ins. Ed., June 7, 1985, at
1; Mary Jane Fisher, Industry Trade Groups Hit GAO Report on Taxation, Nafl
Underwriter: Prop. & Casualty Ins. Ed., March 2, 1984, at 1.
102 Lois J . Lyons, Government, Industry Leap into Tax Brouhaha, Nat'l Underwriter:
Prop. & Casualty Ins. Ed., June 3, 1983, at 6 ("If Congress wants to impose a greater
tax burden on property and casualty insurers it will do so, whatever arguments we
advance, without paying all that much attention to the effect that tax code revisions
may have on either our business or the public we serve.") (quoting Andrew
Maisonpierre, senior vice-president, Alliance of American Insurers); Morais, supra
note 73, at 82-83 (noting that "neither GAO nor Treasury is exactly sympathetic" to
position of insurance companies and suggesting that adoption of discounting is likely).
See also Mary Jane Fisher, P&C Tax Outlook Gloomy with Uncle Sam Taking Bigger
Bite, Nat'l Underwriter: Prop. & Casualty Ins. Ed., Dec. 20, 1985, at 1; Mary Jane
Fisher, P&C Companies Worried Over New Tax Proposal, Nat'l Underwriter: Prop.
& Casualty Ins. Ed., Dec. 7, 1984, at 1 (discussing industry opposition to reform
proposals, including reserve discounting requirements proposed by Treasury
Department and GAO); Mary Jane Fisher, P/C Tax Reform Looms Next Year, Nat'l
Underwriter: Prop. & Casualty Ins. Ed., June 19, 1984, at 1 ("Key members of
congressional tax-writing committees have warned property and casualty insurers that
although the way they pay corporate taxes was not affected by the 1984 tax reform
and deficit reduction legislation, next year will be their tum to undergo scrutiny and
possible revision."); Jon Harkavy & Haren R. Kahn, GAO Backs Taxing Loss
Reserves, Risk Mgmt, May 1985, at 7 (summarizing GAO report and urging Senate
to "consider the issue of premium impact and market capacity") .
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incentive to increase their loss reserves so as to maximize the
size of the fresh-start deduction. Recognizing this possibility,
Congress included a provision in the '86 Act prohibiting the
application of the fresh-start rule to any reserve strengthening
that occurred in 1986. Under this exception to the fresh-start
rule, any reserve strengthening in the 1986 reporting year would
have to be treated as if it had been made in 1987, under the new
discounting rules.
Thus, although the insurer would be
permitted to deduct the undiscounted value of the reserve
strengthening in 1986, it would be required to return the amount
of the discount into income in 1987. 103
We might therefore expect to see an especially large increase
in the degree of loss-reserve conservatism in the 1986 reporting
year. However, because of the anti-strengthening rules, the
additional incentive created by the fresh-start rule might be
reduced. As the anti-strengthening rules do not apply to the
1986 accident year, we might expect to see insurers report an
especially conservative 1986 accident-year reserve in the 1986
reporting year. 104
If, however, insurers had already begun
reserving conservatively in 1984 and 1985, then 1986 would not
have appeared significantly different from those years and may
have even shown a reduction in reserve conservatism. Indeed,
Treasury II proposed to make the tax-reform legislation
103 For a discussion of the mechanics of the fresh-start provision, see Treas. Reg.
§1.846-3(e) (1996).
104 My primary prediction is of increased loss-reserve conservatism in 1984-86, the
period between when the discounting requirement and corporate rate reduction were
first seriously proposed and, in the case of 1986, when the Act became effective. I
would, however, also predict that loss reserves reported after the enactment of the '86
Act would be more conservative than in years prior to 1984, but for somewhat
different reasons than discussed above. First, it could have been expected that
insurers, following the enactment of '86 Act, would attempt to offset some of their
increased tax burden by increasing the degree of conservatism in their reserves. In
fact, just such a response was predicted by some insurance-industry officials in their
comments on the GAO discounting proposals that were circulated within the industry
in 1984. See GAO Report, supra note 62, at 88 (reprinting comments of several
insurance groups including Alliance of American Insurers, National Association of
Independent Insurers, and Reinsurance Association of America). One critic of the
GAO discounting proposal suggested that following the enactment of a discounting
requirement, the IRS would interpret any future reserve strengthening as an attempt
to offset the tax change. The GAO's response to this concern was simple: "li
property-casualty reserves are understated they should be strengthened. H they are
strengthened for tax reasons, the IRS should scrutinize them." Id.
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regarding the new reserve discounting requirement effective as
of January 1, 1986.1os Therefore, if property-casualty insurers
were influenced significantly by Treasury II, they would have
believed that 1985 may have been their last year to get the tax
arbitrage benefits of conservative reserving.
Note also that, as mentioned above, with all of these
predictions one would expect the greatest tax effects to be seen
in the long-tail lines of insurance, such as Other Liability and
Medical Malpractice. This is because the difference between the
undiscounted value of the loss-reserve deduction and the
discounted value of the later loss reserve inclusion would be
greater the longer the tail of the risk.
ill. A FIRST LOOK AT THE DATA 106

This Part considers some of the available data bearing on
whether the '86 Act actually affected property-casualty insurers'
loss reserving practices in 1984-86. The source of the data is

Best's Aggregates & Averages: Property-Casualty Edition,

10s Treasury II, supra note 83, at 269. Jan. 1, 1986, was the scheduled effective date
listed in Treasury I for the loss reserve discounting. 2 Treasury I, supra note 82, at
275. Under Treasury I, however, the reduction in corporate rates was to be phased
in from July 1, 1986 to January l, 1987. Id. at 129.
106 In Bradford & Logue, supra note 76, we looked at some of these same data but
with a different focus. There we examined the effects of the income tax generally and
of the '86 Act's changes specifically on the hypothetical break-even prices of property
casualty insurance policies in the five major lines of insurance. Then we compared
those predicted price effects to actual changes in prices based on industry data. In this
Article, I assume that reported loss-reserves may be manipulated, because of the
discretionary element inherent in insurance accounting and because of the yarious uses
(regulatory, tax, financial) to which the reported loss-reserve numbers are put. In
addition, this Article attempts to measure the extent to which property-casualty
insurers did manipulate their loss reserves to take advantage of the changes in the '86
Act. In Bradford & Logue, however, we developed a model that assumes no bias (no
manipulation) in loss reserve calculations. Thus we took the reported loss reserves as
an unbiased measure of the quantity of insurance sold in a given year; similarly, we
used the inverse loss ratio as an unbiased measure of insurance price. Our hypothesis
was that for post '86 Act years prices should have increased, because of the
introduction of the discounting requirement (among other things) and that the effect
should have been most pronounced with respect to the long-tail lines. In future work,
Professor Bradford and I plan to develop an approach to estimating the discretionary
element in insurance reserving. If successful, that approach would provide a more
rigorous means of determining the extent to which property-casualty insurers
manipulated their reserves to exploit the transition from the pre-'86 Act to post-'86
Act worlds.
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published by A.M. Best Company. Best collects annual
statements from insurance companies and from affiliated groups
of insurance companies every year and publishes the data in
various forms. It also rates individual companies and affiliated
groups of companies in an effort to indicate the companies' or
groups' bottom-line financial strength. Aggregates & Averages
contains industry-wide data organized largely in annual
statement form. In this Part, I compare the relevant loss
reserving data in the 1984-86 period-the crisis period-with the
data from other periods, looking for patterns that are consistent
or inconsistent with the tax hypothesis.
Before discussing the findings, however, I should first mention
a few important limitations of the analysis. In this Article, I
make no attempt to control systematically for variables other
than tax law. I have instead concentrated exclusively on the
summary statistics that can be derived from the aggregated
annual statement data published in Aggregates & Averages. As
will be seen below, these data at least provide an interesting
point of departure for future research.107
On this initial cut at the data, the results are equivocal. Some
of the findings are consistent with my theory, and some are not.
In any event, none of the findings disproves the theory. And, in
my own view, they seem somewhat more consistent with the tax
based theory than with alternative theories, but reasonable
people could disagree on this point.
One initial observation is that property-casualty insurers in
the aggregate suddenly increased their loss reserves by a larger
than usual amount in 1984 and 1985. One measure of the
suddenness and the size of this increase is the increase in the
loss ratio. The loss ratio is the ratio of the change in the
insurer's total loss reserves for a given reporting year to the total
premiums earned by the insurer for that year.108 Thus, if an
101 As it turns out, there is no easy way to isolate the effect of the tax variable
definitively. One approach would be to compare the loss-reserving behavior of high
incorue firms with that of low-income firms (or firms in net-operating-loss positions).
Such an approach, however, requires detailed firm-specific data. This Article is
limited to the analysis of industry-wide aggregate data. Although industry statistics
are readily available, the detailed firm-specific data that would be needed for the
further comparisons mentioned above are extremely difficult to obtain.
10s A distinction is often made between the net loss ratio and the pure loss ratio.
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insurer were to increase its loss reserves as a percentage of its
premiums earned, the insurer's loss ratio would also increase.
As illustrated in Chart 1, there was an increase in loss ratios in
the 1984 and 1985 reporting years, when compared to the
increases in prior reporting years.109
Chart 111°

Loss Ratio by Reporting Year: All Property-Casualty Lines Combined
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To get a sense of the relative size of the jump in loss ratios in
1984 (which increase was sustained in 1985) compared to the
smaller but steady increases in the preceding five years, consider
The net loss ratio includes changes in the reserve for loss-administration expenses,
such as attorneys' fees. The pure loss ratio leaves out such expenses. Troxel &
Bouchie, supra note 61, at 185-86. In technical terms, the net loss ratio is calculated
as follows: Net Loss Ratio (Losses Incurred + Loss Expenses Incurred)/Premium
Earned. The resulting number typically is then multiplied by 100. The pure loss ratio
simply leaves loss expenses incurred out of the numerator. Id. at 186. For the
purpose of this Article, however, I use the net loss ratio exclusively.
109 The astute reader will notice an even larger jump in the aggregate loss ratio for
the 1992 reporting year. That increase, however, seems to have an easy non-tax
explanation: 1992 was the worst year in history for insured losses from natural
disasters, the largest of which was hurricane Andrew. It was also the year of the riots
following the Rodney King verdict. Don Lewis Kirk, Insured CAT Losses Lighter in
'95, Bus. Ins., Jan 8, 1996, at 17 (listing 1992 as record year for insured catastrophic
losses).
110 Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (198794).
=

1996]

Liability Insurance Crisis

939

the changes in percentage terms. The percentage increase in the
combined loss ratio over the preceding reporting year were as
follows: 1978 (-.08%); 1979 (4.3 %); 1980 (2.5 %); 1981 (2.5 %);
1982 (3.9%); 1983 (2.1 %); 1984 (8.2%). Thus, the percentage
increase in 1984 was almost double that of any other single-year
increase during the preceding five years.
One question this Chart poses for my hypothesis is why 1985
did not have even greater reserve increases than 1984, rather
than remaining flat in 1985. After all, if the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 was imminent in 1984, it was even more imminent in
1985. There are two responses to this observation. First, from
the point of view of the insurers deciding in 1984 and 1985 what
reserves to report, it is not clear in which year their perception
that the Act would be enacted would be greatest. In fact, the
perceived likelihood of enactment probably varied from month
to month, from week to week, and even from day to day,
depending upon how the various tax reform proposals were
playing in Congress or in the press. Second, if the insurers
raised reserves in 1984 to take advantage of the impending tax
changes, it would limit their ability to overstate reserves even
further in the following year. As discussed supra, the presence
of state regulations and of financial markets places absolute
limits on the degree of discretion that insurers have to overstate
reserves.
Consistent with the tax-based explanation of the crisis, the
loss-reserve increases in 1984 and 1985 appear to have been
more pronounced in the long-tail lines, such as Other Liability
and Medical Malpractice, than in the short-tail lines, such as
Homeowners Multiple Peril. It should also be noted, however,
that the loss ratio increases in percentage terms for Other
Liability and Medical Malpractice do not appear to have been
as pronounced in 1984 and 1985 as in some earlier years. For
example, according to Chart 2, the percentage increases in
Medical Malpractice loss ratios in 1980 and in 1982 may have
been greater than in 1984 or 1985.
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The sudden increase in aggregate loss reserves can also be
seen in the large jump in industry-wide underwriting losses in
1984 and 1985. An insurer suffers an underwriting loss when its
loss-reserve deduction (and other underwriting expenses) for a
given reporting year exceeds the premiums earned during that
year. Thus, if the growth in the industry's aggregate loss
reserves in a given reporting year exceeds premiums earned by
the industry during the same year, the industry will report an
underwriting loss. Property-casualty insurers often experience
underwriting losses, even in the aggregate across the industry.
This phenomenon is largely due to the practice of cash-flow
underwriting, discussed above. Thus, whether the industry
111 Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (198794). The data in the loss ratio charts come from the "Cumulative by Line
Underwriting Experience" tables in Best's Aggregates and Averages. Because each
volume of Best's contains data for only the ten previous years, I used the 1994 volume
for reporting years 1984-93. Then I went to the next most recent volume to get each
successively earlier reporting year (for example, 1993 for the 1983 year). The danger
with this approach is that, when one uses more than one volume of Best's, one runs
the risk that the data set will have changed somewhat from one year to the next. The
amount of change in the data set, however, is typically extremely small, according to
property-casualty industry analysts at Best's.
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shows an overall net profit will depend on both the size of their
underwriting losses and the amount of their offsetting
investment income.
Although it is common for the property-casualty industry to
experience underwriting losses, the increase in the reported
underwriting loss in 1984 (which increase was essentially
sustained in 1985) was nevertheless remarkable. In absolute
terms, the increase in the industry's overall underwriting loss
from 1983 to 1984 (a $7.9 billion increase) was almost twice the
size of the next largest increase to that point in the industry's
history.
Chart 3112
Property-Casualty Industry Operating Results: Underwiting Gains (above the line)
and Losses (below the line) as a Percentage of Premiums Earned

Again, one plausible explanation for this increase in
underwriting losses in 1984 and 1985 was the tax-based incentive
to overstate loss reserves during those years. These reserve
increases could have been caused (or at least triggered) by the
industry's realization that certain tax-reform measures-in
particular, the loss-reserve discounting requirement and the
reduction in corporate rates-were both almost certain to
become law in the near future, presenting a unique opportunity
for tax arbitrage through increasing loss reserves.
112 Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (198794). This Chart is based on data reported in the "Industry Operating Results" in
Best's volumes 1987-94.
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On the other hand, the data could also be understood to
support the tort hypothesis. It could be argued that the
property-casualty industry in 1984 and 1985 perceived itself to be
entering into a period of rapidly increasing tort judgments. On
this view, the sudden increase in reserves would be seen as the
appropriate (unbiased) result of change in the industry's
perception of the level of liability risk that they were insuring.
The tort-based explanation, however, has two problems. First,
as discussed above in Part I.A., proponents of the tort theory
have offered little evidence of a sudden increase in tort awards
or of anything else to which a sudden change in perceptions in
1984 and 1985 could be attributed.113 Second, the tort hypothesis
does not easily explain the increase in the loss ratios in 1984 and
1985. This point is worth emphasizing: H there had been a
substantial increase in perceived risks in those years (which is
the essential claim of the tort hypothesis), one would have
expected property-casualty premiums to rise at least as rapidly as
loss reserves did. At the very least, the tort hypothesis provides
no reason to expect loss-reserve deductions in 1984-85 to have
outpaced earned premiums; whereas, that result is entirely
consistent with the tax-based explanation.114
One other explanation of the underwriting results (and,
indeed, of the loss ratio increases discussed supra) is pure
random error. That is, in a pure stochastic enterprise such as
predicting future insurance claims, one must expect some degree
of random error; and it is at least possible that the
extraordinarily bad nature of the hard market in the mid-1980s
is purely random. Although that possibility cannot be ruled out,
113 One might lay some of the blame on the increase in paid claims by insurers in

1984.

Whereas the percentage increase in paid claims for Other Liability, for example,
had hovered around 18-20% for the preceding four years, there was a 27% increase
in 1984, followed by a 24% increase in 1985. I.I.I., Crisis and Recovery, supra note
47, at 15.
114 One might try to explain the rise in loss ratios as being attributable primarily to
reserve strengthenings. If that were true, the plausibility of the tort hypothesis
increases. However, in the aggregate, reserve strengthenings account for only a small
portion of the overall addition to reserves for any given reporting year. For example,
in the 1993 reporting year, the combined property-casualty losses incurred for the 1993
accident year were approximately $174 billion; whereas, for all prior accident years,
the 1993 combined reserve adjustment was a $2 billion weakening. Best's Aggregates
and Averages, at Sched. P, Pt. 2, Summary (1994).
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I shall continue to explore the ways in which the data serve to
confirm or disconfinn the tax hypothesis.
Another possible test of the tax-based explanation would be
to examine aggregate reserve strengthenings and weakenings for
the property-casualty industry. A reserve strengthening occurs
when, in a given reporting year, an insurer revises upward the
loss reserves for one or more earlier accident years (that is, the
reserves for policies written in previous years). Likewise, a
reserve weakening (or "release") occurs when, in a given
reporting year, the insurer revises downward a loss reserve for
an earlier accident year. A net reserve strengthening in a given
reporting year increases the insurer's loss-reserve tax deduction.
Insurers therefore would have had an incentive to use reserve
strengthenings in 1984-86 to exploit the tax-arbitrage opportunity
created by the impending tax reform. Thus, if the tax hypothesis
is correct, we would expect to see an increase in the size of
overall reserve strengthenings (or a decrease in the size of
overall reserve weakenings) for the 1984-86 reporting years.
As illustrated in Chart 4 below, a noticeable increase in
reserve strengthenings occurred in the 1984, 1985, and 1986
reporting years, with the largest strengthenings in 1985.
Moreover, the largest strengthenings appeared in the crisis lines
of Medical Malpractice and Other Liability.
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Chart 411s
Total Reserve Strengthenings (above the line) and Weakenings (below the line) by Line of Insurance:
measured as a percentage change from prior reporting year
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All of these findings are generally consistent with the
predictions of the tax hypothesis. The increase in reserve
strengthenings in 1984-86 could be explained as a response to
the incre&sed tax benefit that was created by the tax-reform
proposals. The reserve strengthenings, however, could also be
attributed to a crisis in tort law. To support that theory,
however, one would need to argue that sometime in 1984 or
1985 insurers came to the realization that their loss reserves for
prior accident years had previously been vastly
understated-that they abruptly realized that their initially
reported loss reserves for prior accident years had not fully
taken into account the revolutionary expansion in tort law.

115 Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (199094), and author's calculations. The data in this Chart are taken from Schedule P-Part
2 numbers published in Aggregates and Averages. To provide as much data as
possible, I combined Part 2 data from several volumes of Aggregates and Averages, the
most recent being the 1994 volume.
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Although it is impossible to disprove this hypothesis, there is
little evidence to support it. Thus, under the tort theory, the
timing question remains unanswered: Why 1984 and 1985?
What event in the civil liability system occurred during those
years to induce insurers to institute such massive reserve
strengthenings?
Another empirical approach to testing the tax hypothesis is to
examine how the loss reserves reported by property-casualty
insurers for the 1984, 1985, and 1986 accident years "developed"
over time as compared to other accident years. If the 1984-86
accident-year reserves were weakened in later years to an
unusual degree, it would suggest that those accident-year
reserves had been overstated relative to other accident-years'
reserves. Thus, looking at how a given accident-year reserve has
developed over time provides a rough measure of the extent to
which the initial reserve was biased upward or downward.
Of course, even if insurers were completely unbiased in their
loss-reserve calculations, their decisions being completely
unaffected by tax, financial, or regulatory concerns, the reported
results would nevertheless reflect imperfect information. Thus,
the initially reported reserves for a given accident year would
inevitably have to be strengthened or weakened to some extent
somewhere down the line. That is simply the result of random
error. (Not even actuaries can predict the future perfectly.)
Therefore, we must be extremely careful about any inferences
we draw from the fact that a given accident-year loss reserve
(seen in isolation) had to be strengthened or weakened in later
reporting years. That caveat does not mean, however, that no
inferences can be drawn from changes in broad patterns of loss
reserve development.
For example, if the '86 Act did
significantly increase the incentive to overstate loss reserves (or
decrease the incentive to understate loss reserves), as I have
argued it did, we would expect there to be a noticeable change
in the pattern of loss-reserving error in the industry-wide data
during the transitional period.
At first blush, the loss-development data from Aggregates &
Averages suggest a dramatic change in loss-reserving practices
starting in 1986. What is especially interesting is that the change
appears to have been permanent-the loss-development pattern
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for all accident years after 1985 is substantially different from
the pattern for all pre-1986 accident years. To see this point,
first consider Table 3.1, which contains loss-development data
for all property-casualty lines combined for accident years 198192.
Table 3.1116
Total Loss Development by Accident Year {percentage change in reserve compared to
originally reported reserve)
All

Property-Casualty Lines

Number of years of Loss Development
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1981

-1.07%

-1.49%

-1.27%

-0.27%

0.41%

0.92%

1.21%

1.67%

2.04%

5.68%

5.96%

Accident
Year
1982

-0.44%

0.61%

2.18%

3.43%

4.40%

4.89%

5.32%

1983

-1.07%

4.96%

6.62%

8.15%

8.88%

9.45%

9.97% 1050% 11.20%

1984

3.11%

6.17%

8.52%

9.76%

10.64%

1985

1.69%

3.92%

5.23%

6.09%

6.53%

1986

-1.90%

-1.52%

-2.57%

-3.01%

-3.23%

-3.47% -3.64%

1987

-2.09%

-3.19%

-4.27%

-4.89%

-5.29%

-5.68%

1988

-2.09%

-2.62%

-3.44%

-3.96%

-4.23%

-1.57%

1989

-0.44%

-0.84%

-1.12%

1990

-1.29%

-0.58%

-0.62%

1991

-1.80%

-1.38

1992

-2.01%

11.19% 11.87% 12.82% 13.11%
7.07%

7.65%

7.85%

For purposes of comparison, look at the third year (column
3) of loss development for each accident year 1981-90. 111
According to Table 3.1, as of the third year of loss development,
the loss reserves attributable to all property-casualty policies
116 Source: A.M. Best, Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (1990-94),
and author's calculations. The loss-development numbers are derived from Schedule
P-Part 2 numbers published in Aggregates and Averages.
m Because of the nature of loss-development data, the more recent the accident
year, the less data we have. Thus, because the most recent annual statement data
contained in the latest issue of Aggregates & Averages are for the 1993 accident year,
we have only one year of loss-development for the 1992 accident year and none for
the 1993 accident year. However, for the 1981 accident year, we have nine years of
loss development.
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written in the 1981-90 accident years had to be weakened or
strengthened by the following percentages respectively (positive
percentages represent strengthenings and negative ones
represent weakenings): 1981 (-1.27%), 1982 (2.18%), 1983

(6.62%), 1984 (8.52%), 1985 (5.23 %), 1986 (-2.57%), 1987
(-4.27%), 1988 (-3.44%), 1989 (-1.12%), 1990 (-0.62%). Before
1986, the loss reserves for every accident year but one turned
out to have been understated, requiring reserve strengthenings
by the third year. And note that, if we take a peek at the fifth
year of loss development (column 5), even the 1981 reserves
eventually required strengthening rather than weakening. In
contrast, the reserves for the 1986 accident year and for all later
accident years for which we have data proved to have been
initially overstated-they all required reserve weakenings. This
finding holds even if we look at the later years of loss
development in Table 3.1. A similar pattern also shows up in
every individual line of insurance.
Upon a closer examination of the data, however, the big
change in the loss-reserving pattern appears to have occurred
not in 1986 but in 1985 or 1984. To see this point, consider
Chart 5, which is based upon the loss-development data from
column 3 of Table 3.1. This chart reflects the extent to which
the loss reserves for the 1981 through 1990 accident years were
either understated (i.e., had to be strengthened in later years) or
overstated (i.e., had to be weakened in later years) , measured as
of three years of loss development.
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Chart 511s
All Property-Casualty Lines Combined: Percentage Change in Reservirig Error
(Over- or Understatement) by Accident Year

10.00%
8.00% +-----6.00% 4----4.00%
200%
0.00%
-200%

84

85

-4.00%
-6.00%
Accident year

As shown in the Chart, the primary change in the direction of
property-casualty insurers' loss-reserving practices occurred in
1985. Until 1985, property-casualty insurers had been under
stating their loss reserves by a larger degree every year. Then in
1985, although the reserve for that accident year also was under
stated, it was understated by a much smaller amount than the
1984 accident-year reserve. And, as already mentioned, the 1986
accident-year reserve was actually overstated, as were all of the
following accident years.
A similar story can be told with respect to each individual line
of insurance. In the Other Liability line, for example, not only
did the pattern change in 1985, but also by far the largest
reduction in the degree of understatement (or increase in the
degree of overstatement) occurred with respect to the 1985
accident-year reserves.

us Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (199094), and author's calculations.
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Chart 6119
Other Liability: Percentage Change in Reserving Error (Over- or

35.00%

Understatement) by Accident Year

30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
-5.00%
-10.00%
-15.00%

Accident Year

With respect to Medical Malpractice insurance, the change in the
pattern occurred in 1984 and was continued in 1985 and 1986.

119 Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (199094), and author's calculations.
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Chart 7120
Medical Malpractice: Percentage Change in Reserving Error (Over- or
Understatment) by Accident Year

40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
-10.00%

81

82

83

84

85

-�-11-1�-

.

--

-20.00%
Accident Years

Essentially the same pattern appears in the short-tail lines as
well, with even larger changes in loss-reserving patterns in 1984
and 1985 than those seen in the long-tail lines. 121
So how do we account for these strange loss-development
patterns? Here is one story: First, it is clear from the data that
property-casualty insurers had actually been understating their
loss reserves for several years before the enactment of the '86
Act: Every accident-year before 1986 had to be strengthened
considerably. Why did the industry underreserve in that way?
One would expect to see underreserving in some years, merely
because of the random nature of the property-casualty business.
But the consistent and prolonged underreserving seen in the pre
'86 accident years is a bit difficult to explain. Perhaps insurers
uo Source: A.M. Best Co., Best's Aggregates and Averages: Property-Casualty (199094), and author's calculations.
121 This last finding is not entirely consistent with the tax hypothesis, which would
predict that the change in the pattern of loss-reserving error should be more
pronounced for the long-tail than for the short-tail lines.
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were systematically over-optimistic. That is, perhaps they simply
underestimated the size of their liabilities for policies written in
1981-86 and only realized the true size of their obligations in
later years.
Alternatively, perhaps they were especially
influenced by financial or regulatory biases during those years,
which gave them incentives to exercise their reserving discretion
so as to understate reserves and boost their reported earnings
and reported surplus.
The question most relevant to this Article, however, is what
happened in 1984, 1985, and 1986 that made insurers change this
loss-reserving pattern. Why in 1985 (in 1984 for Other Liability)
did the industry in the aggregate dramatically reduce the extent
to which it was underreserving and then, in 1986, actually
overreserve?
The tax hypothesis provides one plausible
explanation: Perhaps insurers in 1984 and 1985 began to see the
tax benefit of relatively conservative loss reserving, thus
beginning the change in the loss-reserving pattern.
Under this theory, though, why would the pattern continue
after 1986? Since the tax-arbitrage opportunity described infra
Part II was only temporary and should have existed only for
1984-86, why did insurers continue to overstate their reported
loss reserves in post-'86 years? The answer is unclear. It is
possible that this trend has little to do with income taxes. There
is, however, one possible explanation that does involve taxes
and, specifically, the effect of the '86 Act. Following the
enactment of the '86 Act, it may be that property-casualty
insurers decided to continue their relatively new practice of
reserving conservatively in an effort to offset the new tax burden
imposed by the Act. Indeed, in commenting on the 1984 GAO
reserve-discounting proposal, industry officials warned that
insurers might respond to the tax-reform proposals this way.
These officials argued that, for many years property-casualty
insurers had been understating their reserves (for whatever
reason) and that the insurers would take this occasion-the
enactment of the reserve-discounting requirement and the other
changes affecting property-casualty insurers-to correct that
practice.122
122 For example, the following statement was made by the Vice President of
Government Public Affairs at Continental Insurance upon hearing of the loss-reserve
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An economist might find this story puzzling.
Under
traditional economic theory, when the '86 Act was enacted,
insurers should already have been maximizing (or, more
precisely, optimizing) the extent to which they could overstate
their loss reserves for tax purposes, given the benefits and costs
of doing so. Under that assumption, an insurer would not be
able to increase the amount of reserve overstatement in a given
year unless there was a change in the benefits or costs of doing
so. For example, as discussed infra Part II, during the period
between 1984 and 1986, the tax benefit of overstating reserves
was substantially (albeit temporarily) increased. For tax years
after 1986, however, that particular tax-incentive should have
disappeared and the amount of overstatement should have
That is, under
returned to some lower equilibrium level.
standard assumptions of competitive markets, the introduction
of a higher federal income tax burden for post-'86 tax years
(owing to the enactment of the '86 Act) should not have
resulted in a continued pattern of reserve overstatement.
For an observer of the property-casualty insurance industry,
however, this explanation for the post-'86 reserving pattern is at
least plausible. Participants in this industry, in their pricing
decisions and their accounting decisions, often do not seem to
follow the patterns predicted by traditional economic theory, and
certainly not the patterns expected of perfectly competitive
markets. The existence of the property-casualty cycles, for
example, is itself a puzzle for the economist.123 Perhaps insurers,
prior to 1984-86, had not seriously considered the tax advantage
derived from conservative loss-reserving, and their experience

discounting proposal: "If the IRS tells us we have to discount, we'll put pressure on
our people to do a better job estimating reserves. That means the first year you would
see a large increase in reserves coupled with a discount. The IRS would say that it's
a blatant and obvious attempt to get around the discount." Morais, supra note 73, at
85 (quoting William Gibson).
123 In more recent years, some have argued that the property-casualty cycle has
disappeared. Dan Lonkevich, Pricing and Consolidation: Farewell to the P/C Cycle?,
Best's Review, Property-Casualty Insurance Edition, Sep. 1995, at 24-31 (attributing
end of cycle and prolonged period of soft pricing to competition-enhancing
consolidation within the property-casualty insurance market). Of course, whether the
recent prolonged period of soft pricing in the property-casualty market reflects an end
to the cycle or an increase in the length of the time between turns in the cycle remains
to be seen.
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during that period revealed to them for the first time that the
benefits were large and the costs (for example, the amount of
IRS scrutiny they should expect) were small.
There is a different version of the tax-based story, however,
that is arguably more consistent with the evidence than the one
just given. Under this version, property-casualty insurers, before
the enactment of the '86 Act, were not especially concerned
about their federal tax liability, because they generally did not
pay much, if anything, in federal income taxes. According to
one report of the General Accounting Office, which was based
on data from Best's, the combined federal income tax liability of
the property-casualty industry for the tax years 1976 through
1985 were as follows (in millions, with negative tax liabilities in
parentheses): $148; $1 ,015; $1,389; $896; $593; $55; ($716);
($1,218); ($1,732); ($2,030).124 Thus, starting in 1982, although
many insurers paid federal income taxes, the industry in the
aggregate had a negative tax liability each year; and the total net
federal income tax liability for the industry during that whole
ten-year period was negative $1.6 billion. Note that negative tax
liabilities create carryovers, which can be carried backward or
forward to offset tax liabilities in other years. Given these
conditions, the property-casualty insurers would still have the
same tax incentive to overstate their reserves (that is, to boost
their loss carryovers), but less so than if they had been awash in
taxable income.
When, however, the '86 Act was passed (with the introduction
of the reserve-discounting requirement), property-casualty insur
ers suddenly had a greater likelihood of having taxable income.
Thus, putting to one side the possibility of anticipatory reserve
manipulation before the enactment of the '86 Act, the tax incen
tive favoring loss-reserve conservatism would be substantially
greater than for post-'86 Act years than for pre-'86 Act years,
simply because of the increase in the trend toward reserve
conservatism for the post-'86 Act years and in the persistence of
that trend for some years into the future, as seen in Table 3.1
supra. In addition, even under this story, there still would have
been a one-time extraordinary effect on reserving incentives
124 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Profitability
of the Medical Malpractice and General Liability Lines, at 20 tbl. II.1 (1987).
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prior to the enactment of the '86 Act, if the tax changes were
anticipated-just as described in Part II.C. supra. The only
difference is the tax year in which the tax benefit would be put
to use: Under this version of the tax-based story, most of the tax
benefit to insurers of the reserve increases in 1984, 1985, and
1986 would come in the form of loss carryovers, which were then
carried forward to offset the increased post-'86 Act taxable
income.
IV. THE LINK BETWEEN THE TAX HYPOTHESIS
AND THE CRISIS

Now assume that the conclusions of Parts II and III are true.
Assume that the property-casualty industry was, in fact, induced
by the prospect of tax reform to increase dramatically its loss
reserves in 1984-86. So what? What does that finding have to
do with the insurance crisis of 1985-86? More specifically, how
would tax-induced loss-reserve increases in 1984, 1985, or 1986
cause the sudden reductions in supply and the sudden increases
in premiums for the crisis lines of liability insurance? In
exploring possible connections between the tax-induced loss
reserve increases and the insurance crisis of 1985-86, I will
consider two alternative stories. The first is a version of the
capacity-constraint theory described supra Part I.C. The second
is a version of the collusion or price-coordination theory de
scribed in Part I.B.
Consider first the capacity-constraint theory. When property
casualty insurers boosted their loss reserves in 1984 and 1985 (at
least in part to exploit the tax-arbitrage opportunity described
above), it produced a reduction in the industry's surplus. That
reduction in surplus, in tum, would be expected to have the
effect of pushing premiums upward, for the reasons discussed in
Part I.C. In sum, insurers would reduce the amount of insurance
they write to minimize the risk of insolvency (until their surplus
has a chance to build back up) and to minimize the chance of
regulatory intervention. This contraction in supply would be
expected to cause prices to rise sharply.
This process is magnified by the statutory accounting
treatment of unearned premiums and of policy acquisition
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expenses.125 The basic idea is this: When an insurance company
writes a policy and receives a premium, for regulatory purposes
the company does not include the premium in income until it is
"earned," which occurs pro rata during the course of the year.
Thus, at the beginning of a one-year policy none of the premium
is earned, and by the end of the period all of the premium is
earned. 126 However, whereas the premium income is taken into
account incrementally over the course of the year, the insurer is
required by statutory accounting principles to deduct up front
any expense incurred in acquiring-or selling-the policy.121 As
a result of this mismatching of revenue and expenses (the
deferred recognition of premium revenue and the accelerated
recognition of policy acquisition expenses) , whenever an
insurance company writes a policy, there is always initially a
large negative effect on the company's surplus.128
Since
acquisition expenses (including commissions) are tied to
premiums, this effect is multiplied when the premiums charged
for the new policy are increased over the previous year's policy.
The effect of all these accounting rules is that a large increase
in premiums such as that seen in 1985 and 1986,129 rather than
1zs

See generally Mooney & Cohen, supra note 4, at 22-26.
22. Technically, this exclusion is accomplished through the unearned
premium reserve. When the insurer writes the policy it includes the premium revenue
in its income but then takes a deduction for the annual increase in its unearned
premium reserve, the net effect being an exclusion for any premium received that has
not been earned during the year. Id.
u1 Generally Accepted Accounting Practices would require a "matching" of revenue
and expense. Statutory accounting expressly and intentionally does not, but rather
requires an acceleration of expenses and a deferral of income. Id. The justification
typically given for this mismatching is the general view of insurance regulators that
insurance companies' reported data should be extremely "conservative."
us To see precisely how this works, see Mooney & Cohen, supra note 4, at 22-26
(example illustrating effect of writing new policy on surplus). The largest such
expense is typically the commission to the agent or broker.
u9 In 1985 and 1986, the property-casualty industry experienced the largest absolute
increases in net premiums written in its history-roughly $26 billion and $32 billion,
respectively, with the next largest absolute increases having occurred in 1976 and 1977,
the previous hard portion of the property-casualty cycle, in the amounts of $11 billion
and $12 billion, respectively. A.M. Best Company, Best's Aggregates and Averages:
Property-Casualty 148 (1991) (data for all lines combined). Moreover, in percentage
terms, 1985 and 1986 showed the largest percentage increases in premiums written in
ten years, that is, since the previous hard market. The percentage increases in net
premiums written for the ten years leading up to this period were as follows: 1976
u6 Id. at

{22%); 1977 {13%); 1978 (13%); 1979 (10%); 1980 (6%); 1981 (4%); 1982 (5%); 1983
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boosting surplus, actually reduces insurers' surplus in the short
run. As time passes, of course, the premium becomes "earned,"
building surplus back up and ultimately, if all goes well, resulting
in a net increase. But for several months, the premium increases
cause a decrease in surplus. Therefore, as insurers increased
their premiums in 1985 and 1986, the temporary negative effect
on surplus would have resulted in further reductions in supply
and, in tum, additional increases in premiums, and so on.
This version of the tax explanation is obviously similar to the
capacity-constraint explanation.
There is one important
difference, however: In the standard capacity-constraint
explanation, the reduction in surplus is real. In the tax-based
explanation, it is not. Under the standard capacity-constraint
explanation, there is at some point a realization that the
insurance industry is underfunded-that the industry's total
liabilities are larger" (or its assets smaller) than had previously
been estimated. Under the tax version of the capacity-constraint
explanation, however, the reduction in surplus is artificial, in the
sense that it is not an effort to ensure an adequate surplus.
Indeed, that is the whole point of the tax theory: Reserves were
increased in response to tax-reform proposals rather than in
response to new information about future liabilities.
The challenge for tax theory therefore is to explain why a tax
induced increase in reserves and reduction in surplus would have
the same effect as would, for example, a sudden realization by
insurers that the liability risks faced by the industry were greater
than had previously been believed. Put differently, how can a
change in an accounting variable that does not reflect a real
change in liabilities affect the real economic decisions of
insurance companies?
One possible explanation involves the role of state regulators.
Even if insurers were aware that their loss-reserve increases
during this period were not entirely real (but rather were at least
partly tax motivated), state insurance regulators may have had
a different interpretation. The regulators may have interpreted
the jump in loss reserves in 1984 and 1985 (and the concomitant
jump in underwriting losses) just as the insurance industry had

(5%); 1984 (8%); 1985 (22%); 1986 (22%).
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portrayed them at the time-as the result of the revolutionary
expansion in tort law. If that were the regulators' interpretation
(or even if insurers perceived that to be a possible interpretation
that regulators might have), the threat of potential regulatory
intervention may have influenced insurers to restrict the supply
of insurance they were writing until their reported surplus could
be replenished to the regulators' satisfaction. In addition, it is
possible that some companies were motivated primarily by the
anticipated tax-law changes and others were motivated primarily
by concerns about the perceived tort crisis. Or perhaps most
insurers were motivated by a combination of both factors. That
is, they were convinced that certain types of risks were
increasing considerably (recall the data from the DOJ Report)
and that, therefore, reserve increases would eventually be
needed. In addition, they were convinced that the optimal time
to increase reserves was just before the enactment of the
impending tax reforms.
In addition to this modified capacity-constraint explanation,
there is also a tax-based explanation that is inspired by a version
of the collusion theory. Under this explanation, one must first
eschew the assumption of a perfectly competitive market for
property-casualty insurance, at least in the following sense:
Pricing and quantity decisions in the property-casualty industry
do in fact exhibit some degree of parallelism and coordination,
at least in the short run and especially during periods of
transition from hard market to soft and back again.
The
standard version of the collusion theory goes something like this:
Although the property-casualty industry is susceptible to price
fixing arrangements (owing to the role of ISO or to the role of
insurance regulators), such arrangements periodically break
down, resulting in periods of intense price competition. These
are the soft periods in the cycle. Then, either because of the
effect of prolonged underreserving followed by the threat of
regulatory intervention, insurers somehow, at some point,
manage to restore discipline to their arrangement and return to
cooperative pricing. This lasts for a time, until companies begin
to cheat on the deal again by cutting prices, and the cycle begins
again.
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The tax hypothesis adds the following wrinkle to the story:
Assume that the above-described collusion theory is plausible
and that the early 1980s was a period in which cartel discipline
had broken down and insurers were cutting prices in competition
for market share, their hope being that the new market share
would prove extremely profitable whenever discipline was
restored to the cartel. Given these assumptions, it is quite
plausible that the return of cartel pricing-the upturn in the
cycle-was hastened and exacerbated by the prospect of tax
reform. If the expectation was that the industry was going to
recartelize and return to supercompetitive pricing at some point,
the ideal time to do so would have been the period between
1984 and 1986, when there was an enormous tax incentive to
increase loss reserves.
The timing would have been ideal
because any suspicious jump in property-casualty premiums
would be masked by even larger increases in reported loss
reserves. And in fact, during this period of "skyrocketing"
premiums, the industry reported the largest underwriting losses
in its history, owing to the massive reserve increases.130 Because
of the large (tax-induced) reserve increases, it was relatively easy
for industry representatives to claim that the reason for the
unprecedented premium increases was the "crisis" in the market
and to argue that, notwithstanding the premium increases, the
industry was in great financial difficulty, thereby avoiding
regulatory intervention, curtailing consumer resentment, and
forestalling market entry by new competitors.
Whether one adopts the capacity-constraint version of the tax
hypothesis or the collusion version or some combination of the
two, it should at least be clear that tax-induced loss reserve
increases of the sort I argue occurred in 1984-86 could have
contributed to the crisis phenomena of 1985 and 1986.
Moreover, without the tax-based explanation, it is difficult to
explain the timing and the suddenness of the crisis; whereas,
with the tax-based explanation, these elements of the crisis begin
to make sense. 131
130 See supra Chart 2.
131 As I have already mentioned, I cannot rule out the possibilty that the precise
timing of the crisis was simply fortuitous, the result of the natural lag time between
events in the world (such as the increase in tort awards) and the effects on insurance
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CONCLUSION
The liability insurance crisis of 1985-86 sparked a period of
furious debate over the appropriate function and design of our
civil liability system and ultimately led to the enactment of tort
reform legislation in many states.
Moreover, the theories
developed during that period to explain the crisis and to justify
tort reform at the state level will continue to shape current
debates over tort reform at both the state and the national
levels. It is important, therefore, for policymakers to have a full
understanding of the crisis of 1985-86 and for them not to
overestimate the causal role of tort law or any other single
factor.
In this Article, I have introduced a previously
unexplored factor that may have contributed to the
crisis-namely, changes in the federal income tax laws, changes
that may have induced property-casualty insurers to engage in
artificial loss-reserve increases, which in turn may have
precipitated (or least exacerbated) the massive premium
increases and coverage reductions that characterized the crisis.
To the extent this new factor has explanatory power, perhaps
less weight should be given to the alternative explanations of the
crisis, including the tort-based explanation. Thus, the Article
sounds a cautionary note for anyone who might be persuaded by
arguments for tort reform that are based on a simplistic version
of the tort-based explanation of the crisis: Such arguments
should be reconsidered in the light of the more complex causal
story told in this Article. And even if one is unpersuaded in the
link between the '86 Act and the insurance crisis, the Article
nevertheless contains a clear warning for would-be tax
reformers: When a proposal is made to "reform" the tax
treatment of a particular industry, a full understanding of the
ultimate efficiency and distributional effects of such a change
will require an analysis of the ways in which the members of
that industry might be able to adjust their accounting and pricing
practices, particularly during the period of transition, to offset
the effects of the change-and perhaps even to pass those effects
along to their customers in the form of higher prices.
companies.

